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INTRODUCTION
The first thirty days of the Trump administration evoked a
contentious debate about the rights of noncitizens. Can the President
suspend the entry of Iraqi, Iranian, Libyan, Somalian, Sudanese,
Syrian, and Yemeni citizens?1 Can Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) officers deport a Deferred Action of Childhood
Arrivals recipient?2 Does an unauthorized migrant have the right to a
protective order against an abuser without running the risk of being
deported?3 Should it matter if these individuals speak English,
understand United States civics, or know how to enroll their child in
elementary school? These and other questions about noncitizens’
rights and what criteria should be used to determine noncitizens’ rights
are becoming a growing part of public discourse in the United States
and in Europe.
Citizenship scholars actively engage these questions and a number
of theories have been offered about how liberal democracies should
distribute rights. This article focuses on postnational citizenship,
global citizenship, and transnational citizenship theories.4 These
theories make specific normative and descriptive claims about the
availability of citizenship rights. The normative claim is that
citizenship rights should be available to noncitizens based on their
personhood and presence within a territory.5 The descriptive claim is
that pursuant to the growth of the international human rights regime
citizenship rights are now available based on personhood rather than
national cultural belonging.6 Some of these scholars decry the
1. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf.
2. See Emily Goldberg, What Immigration Raids Mean for Students, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/02/why-was-a-dacarecipient-detained-by-ice/517134/.
3. See Richard Gonzales, ICE Detains Alleged Victim Of Domestic Abuse At Texas
Courthouse, NPR, (Feb. 16, 2017, 10:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/16/515685385/ice-detains-a-victim-of-domestic-abuse-at-texas-courthouse.
4. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
447, 449 (2000).
5. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY (2010);
RAINER BABCÖCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP (1994); Joseph H. Carens, Citizenship
and Civil Society: What Rights for Residents?, in DUAL NAT’LITY, SOC. RIGHTS AND FED.
CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP, 101-02 (Randal
Hansen & Patrick Weil eds., 2002) [hereinafter DUAL NAT’LITY]; Saskia Sassen, The
Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics, 46 BERKLEY J.
SOC. 4, 6 (2002); Saskia Sassen, The Need to Distinguish Denationalized and Postnational,
7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 575 (2000).
6. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK & ROGERS SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985); YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS
OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE 1 (1994); DAVID
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diminishing role of the State in allocating and protecting citizenship
rights,7 others applaud the development as a tool for ensuring that
noncitizens have the rights that facilitate their economic, political, and
social integration,8 and some contend that postnational citizenship is
“partial, insubstantial, and insecure.”9
This article builds upon the critique that postnational citizenship is
incomplete by arguing that despite the increasing number of rights
made available to noncitizens based personhood and residence, three
categories of rights that are critical for immigrant integration continue
to have a national cultural belonging prerequisite: (1) immigrationrelated rights; (2) economic rights; and (3) political participation rights.
Noncitizens’ access to these rights is conditioned on demonstrating
cultural belonging in the form of civic integration. Citizenship scholars
have noted that the postnational citizenship model is incomplete
because it mainly addresses social rights, or that the rights provided by
the international human rights regime are not self-executing.10 Less
attention has been given to determining whether or not postnational
citizenship grants noncitizens the rights that enable them to fully
develop and benefit from their human capital. To facilitate this
analysis, this article offers a new citizenship rights typology in which
JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP
vii, 2-3 (1997); LAYTON-HENRY HAMMAR, THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF MIGRANT
WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1990); Miriam Feldblum, “Citizenship Matters”:
Contemporary Trends In Europe and the United States, 5 STAN. HUMAN. REV. 97, 107
(1997); Peter Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1,
30 (1997); Culture as used in this article refers to values, norms, and practices. Adopting the
sociological understanding of values and norms, values as used in this project refer to
“abstract ideals” and norms refer to “principles and rules of social life that people are
expected to observe.” ANTHONY GIDDENS ET. AL., INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 54
(2012).
7. See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 6; JACOBSON, supra note 6; Christian
Joppke, The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship, 51 EUR. J. SOC. 9 (2010) (discussing the
“decreasing subjective value” of citizenship in Western states).
8. See SOYSAL, supra note 6; CARENS, supra note 5; Carens, supra note 5; Schuck,
supra note 6, at 30.
9. Michael Jones Correa, Seeking Shelter: Immigrants and the Divergence of Social
Rights and Citizenship in the United States, in DUAL NAT’LITY, supra note 5, at 236; see
also AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL
INEQUALITY 62-63 (2009); Schuck, supra note 6, at 30-33; see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, “The
Right to Have Rights”: Undocumented Migrants and State Protection, 63 KAN. L. REV.
1045 (2015); Randall Hansen, The Poverty of Postnationalism: Citizenship, Immigration,
and the New Europe, 38 THEORY & SOC. 1, 12 (2009); Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality:
Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999,
1005 (2006).
10. See Correa, supra note 9, at 235-36; Bosniak, supra note 4, at 467-68 (noting
that international human rights “are made available to individuals only by way of their
states, which must have affirmatively assumed obligations to enforce them under the various
human rights treaties”).
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citizenship rights are divided into human rights, resident rights, and
membership rights. Use of this typology demonstrates that the
postnational citizenship model only accounts for one of the three types
of rights commonly thought of as citizenship rights. The citizenship
rights typology offered and an analysis of noncitizens’ rights within
European Union member states illustrates that national cultural
belonging, rather than personhood, continues to be the basis upon
which critical citizenship rights are made available to noncitizens.
Immigrants’ access to citizenship rights is important for at least
two reasons. First, it determines the manner in which the State can
interact with immigrants. For example, are noncitizens entitled to due
process when being deported? Can lawful permanent residents
returning to the United States be denied entry because of their
nationality or religion? Citizens cannot be deported or denied entry
into their country of nationality, but does the State have greater
authority over noncitizens? The second reason immigrants’ access to
citizenship rights matters is because access to legal rights shapes
immigrant incorporation patterns.
Immigrant integration or
incorporation occurs when noncitizens’ participation in society is
indistinguishable from the participation of native-born citizens.11 For
example, integration has occurred when the difference in educational
attainment, language skills, access to healthcare, or the employment
rates between citizens and noncitizens is imperceptible. Social
scientists have empirically demonstrated and theoretically explained
that immigrants’ incorporation patterns are shaped by immigrants’
“individual characteristics [and] motivations” and their context of
Immigrants’ context of reception, which includes
reception.12
government policy and legal rights, determines whether or not
immigrants’ individual human capital—language skills, education, and
11. ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT
13, 232–41 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA];
RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION
AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 5–6, 11–12 (2003); ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G.
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STORY OF THE IMMIGRANT SECOND GENERATION 46–48
(2001) [hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES]; Angela M. Banks, The Curious
Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2012) “Immigrant incorporation is achieved when immigrants
are integrated into U.S. society such that it is difficult to differentiate their legal protections,
access to public resources, educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities
from those of native-born citizens.” Throughout this article the terms integration and
incorporation are used interchangeably.
12. HELEN B. MARROW, NEW DESTINATION DREAMING: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND
LEGAL STATUS IN THE RURAL AMERICAN SOUTH 9 (2011). An immigrants’ context of
reception is the “structural and institutional features of the specific contexts that immigrants
enter,” which “influence their experiences and opportunities for mobility.”
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job skills—can be put to its best use.
While the postnational citizenship model is incomplete, it has
made an important contribution to the study of citizenship in the
twenty-first century. This body of scholarship highlights the important
ways in which citizenship rights are disaggregated and decoupled from
citizenship status.13 This reality demonstrates that citizenship status is
not the exclusive vehicle for granting citizenship rights, and that it is
possible to grant noncitizens citizenship rights that would facilitate
integration and social cohesion. An accurate understanding of
noncitizens’ citizenship rights is necessary to determine which rights
are outstanding, whether or not such rights alter an immigrant’s context
of reception, and whether or not such rights should be available based
on personhood, lawful residence, or membership. This article is the
first in a series of articles that undertakes this analysis to ascertain how
best to ensure immigrant integration and better facilitate economic and
social cohesion.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I of the article introduces
the human-resident-membership rights typology to facilitate a more
precise examination of the claims made by postnational citizenship
scholars. Disaggregating the rights that these scholars refer to as
citizenship rights allows one to better analyze which rights are
available based on universal personhood and which continue to be
uniquely available to individuals who can demonstrate national cultural
belonging.
Part II introduces postnational citizenship, and
demonstrates that the citizenship rights available to noncitizens within
this model are human rights rather than resident rights or membership
rights. Part III identifies how the key rights for immigrant
incorporation—the right to enter and reside, the right to remain,
economic activity rights, political participation rights, and education
rights—are allocated within the European Union (“EU”). The article
focuses on the EU because many of the descriptive claims made by
postnational citizenship scholars are based on noncitizens’ rights within
the EU. The rights typology offered in Part II clarifies which of these
rights are human rights, resident rights, or membership rights. The
analysis provided in Part III illustrates the limitations of the
postnational citizenship model. Finally, Part IV contends that
membership within a polity continues to be measured in terms of
national cultural belonging. Therefore, access to the membership
13. See ELIZABETH F. COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 6 (2009);
SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 1 (2004);
Rose Cuison Villazor, Interstitial Citizenship, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 1676, 1678-79) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2772766).
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category of citizenship rights is only available to individuals who are
able to demonstrate civic integration. This significantly limits
noncitizens’ ability to fully develop and utilize their human capital.
I. CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
This article focuses on the role of immigration-related rights,
economic activity rights, political participation rights, and education
rights because these rights play a critical role in the immigrant
incorporation process. Some of these rights are uniquely available to
citizens, others are available based on personhood, and a final group
are available based on lawful residence. This Part introduces the
human-resident-membership rights typology to facilitate a more precise
examination of the claims made by postnational citizenship scholars.
By disaggregating the rights addressed in the postnational citizenship
model, it is possible to determine which rights are available based on
universal personhood and which continue to be uniquely available to
individuals who can demonstrate national cultural belonging. The
second section of this Part examines how States can allocate citizenship
rights to individuals without citizenship status.
A. Rights Typology
Within the citizenship literature there is no agreed upon definition
of citizenship rights. Scholars, advocates, and government officials use
the term to refer to a wide range of rights.14 For example, the right to
enter, reside, and remain in a State’s territory, voting rights, the right to
serve on a jury, the right to bear arms, the right to family life, freedom
of assembly and association, and freedom of movement have all been
characterized as citizenship rights.15 Yet access to these rights varies
significantly. Some are only available to individuals with citizenship
status, others are available to those who are lawfully present within the

14. See Correa, supra note 9, at 235-36 (“Rights for non-citizen residents are rarely part
of a nation-state’s core laws, its constitution. Because of this, I would argue, they do not
deserve to be called citizenship rights.”). T.H. Marshall’s classic account of citizenship
rights focuses on the substance of the rights provided rather than the categories of
individuals who benefit from the rights. Marshall’s typology divides citizenship rights into
civil, political, and social rights. T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10
(1950). The citizenship rights typology offered in this article builds on Marshall’s insights
but recognizes that noncitizens currently have civil and political rights despite lacking
citizenship status.
15. See, e.g., SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 122; see Villazor, supra note 13, at 1712; see
also Correa, supra note 9, at 235 (“Postnational citizenship theorists think of citizenship as a
set of rights that are extended like an umbrella over permanent residents (whomever they
may be in the polity.”).
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society, and others still are available to all who are present. This article
offers a citizenship rights typology to clarify which rights are available
to noncitizens and based on what criteria. Distinguishing between
human rights, resident rights, and citizenship rights provides a basis for
conducting a more nuanced analysis of postnational citizenship. This
rights typology makes visible the disaggregation of citizenship rights
and the decoupling of these rights from citizenship status. The
typology also illustrates that national cultural belonging, rather than
personhood, continues to be the basis upon which some rights
traditionally viewed as citizenship rights are allocated.
Within citizenship-related discourse the term citizenship is used in
a variety of different ways. Legal scholar Linda Bosniak developed a
useful typology for differentiating the various ways in which the term
citizenship is used.16 Citizenship can refer to a legal status, identity,
legal rights, or political engagement.17 Bosniak’s typology offers a tool
for greater clarity and more insightful critiques in citizenship discourse.
Just as citizenship is used in different ways so is citizenship rights.
Some discussions about citizenship rights focus on the rights that all
individuals within a particular territory have while others focus on the
rights that are uniquely available to individuals with citizenship
status.18 The citizenship rights typology offered here provides better
clarity about the types of rights that scholars are referring to when
discussing citizenship rights. Such clarity is necessary for properly
determining how citizenship rights are allocated and understanding
why certain rights are available to noncitizens.
The term citizenship rights refers to rights that are best understood
as human rights, resident rights, and membership rights. Human rights
are rights that are available to every individual by virtue of being
human. These rights ensure that the inherent dignity of all people is
recognized and protected by the State.19 Resident rights are rights that
are available to individuals who are lawfully present within a State’s
territory. These rights facilitate non-members’ economic and social
participation, but they are granted in ways that protect full members’
economic and social rights. Membership rights are rights that facilitate
the fullest participation—economic, social, and political—of
individuals deemed members of the society. It is my contention that
16. Bosniak, supra note 4, at 456-89.
17. Id.
18. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 31-34 (2008).
19. U.N. GAOR, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 10, 1948),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf.
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membership is reserved for those individuals who have the most robust
cultural connection to the State. The legal status of citizen conveys full
membership within a State, and national cultural belonging is an
explicit or implicit requirement for citizenship status. For those
individuals that become citizens via naturalization, cultural belonging
is explicitly tested during the naturalization process. For those who are
citizens by virtue of birth within the country or birth to parents who are
citizens it is assumed that their socialization process will ensure
national cultural belonging. As will be evident in Parts III and IV,
noncitizen’s access to immigration-related economic activity and
political participation rights become more robust with increasing levels
of national cultural belonging.
Human rights, resident rights, and membership rights can be
thought of as concentric circles with membership rights in the innermost ring, resident rights in the middle ring, and human rights in the
outer-most ring.20

Figure 1
Within a given State everyone physically present will have human
rights, those lawfully present will have resident rights and human
rights, and members will have membership rights, resident rights, and
human rights. The robustness of the resident and membership rights
20. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
MARYELLEN FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 49 (2016).
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will depend on the purpose of residence and length of residence, which
often correlate with immigration and citizenship statuses. For example,
long-term residents or lawful permanent residents have a more robust
right to enter their state of residence than first-time arriving foreign
students.21 While both individuals are lawfully present residents, they
were admitted based on different connections to the State, and the
difference in connections allows the long-term resident to be viewed as
more of a member than the student. Citizens, on the other hand, have
an absolute right to enter their country of residence while long-term
residents merely have a robust, but not absolute, right to enter their
state of residence. Citizens are deemed to have greater connections to
the State than long-term residents, which entitles citizens to a more
robust membership status, and greater protection of membership rights.
As basic rights that protect the inherent dignity of all humans,
human rights include rights such as the right to life, liberty, security of
person, criminal procedure rights, freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, freedom of expression, and freedom from discrimination.22
Resident rights include the right to work and engage in other economic
activity in accordance with the rules governing one’s immigration
status, local political participation rights, and access social welfare
benefits.23 Finally, membership rights, include an absolute right to
enter, reside, and remain in one’s country of citizenship, the right to
vote in national elections, run for public office, support political
campaigns, and a fairly absolute right to work.24
The postnational citizenship claim that citizenship rights are
available based on personhood focuses on the availability of human

21. The terms “long-term resident” and “lawful permanent resident” are immigration
statuses that grant noncitizens robust rights in their country of residence. Long-term
resident status is given in EU member states, and lawful permanent resident status is given
in the United States. Both of these statuses are available to noncitizens based on their
family connections to the state or their proposed economic activity in the state of residence.
Since the relevant status in EU member states is long-term resident, this article will utilize
this terminology.
22. The right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of nationality does not extend
to immigration-related rights such as the right to enter and remain. Courts have
continuously held that States have the sovereign right to determine which noncitizens can
enter the country. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07, 609
(1889).
23. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 45, O.J. C 224/1, at 122
(1992) [hereinafter EU Treaty]; Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the on
the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly
qualified employment, May 25, 2009, O.J. (L 155/17) art. 12(3) (2009) [hereinafter EC
Council Directive]. This is a nonexhaustive list of resident rights.
24. See, e.g., EU Treaty, supra note 23. This is a nonexhaustive list of membership
rights.
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rights. While these rights have historically been limited to individuals
with citizenship status, this category of rights are now available to all
based on personhood.25 Yet, there are two additional categories of
citizenship rights that are not available based on personhood—resident
rights and membership rights.
B. Unbundling & Decoupling Citizenship Rights
The idea that noncitizens could be the beneficiaries of citizenship
rights may sound counterintuitive. Yet the citizenship rights typology
introduced in the preceding section clarifies that when scholars,
government officials, and civil society actors speak about citizenship
rights they are often referring to human rights, resident rights, or
membership rights. The umbrella term “citizenship rights” reflects
different understandings and purposes of citizenship. For example,
Bosniak’s work on the “citizenship of aliens” responds to the
differentiation between “citizenship within the community” and
“citizenship at the border.”26 There is a universalist approach to
“citizenship within the community” in which the goal is the “inclusion
Simultaneously there is an
and participation of everyone.”27
exclusionary or particularist approach to “citizenship at the border” in
which the focus is defining the boundaries of the community. In this
context, the goal is not universal inclusion, but rather restricting
membership, which is frequently viewed as “an essential part of a
community’s process of self-definition.”28 This dual approach to
citizenship helps to explain why noncitizens would have certain
citizenship rights, like human rights and resident rights, when they are
physically present within a country.29 However, the “citizenship at the
border” approach to legal rights would make membership rights
uniquely available to individuals with citizenship status. An example
would be granting citizens and physically-present noncitizens different
immigration-related rights. Differentiating between “citizenship within
the community” and “citizenship at the border” provides a basis for
understanding how and why human rights, resident rights, and
membership rights can all be considered citizenship rights, and how

25. See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 18, at 34.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 29 (quoting Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of
the Idea of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 250-51 (1989)).
28. Id. at 33.
29. Rights like due process and equal protection are granted to all individuals within
the community and noncitizens’ physical presence entitles them to human rights and
resident rights.
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they get allocated differently amongst citizens and noncitizens.
The citizenship rights typology introduced in Part I(A)
exemplifies the unbundling of citizenship rights. Rather than viewing
citizenship rights as a tight bundle of rights that are distributed as a
unit, it is more accurate to view them as fundamental civil, political,
economic, and social rights that are “independent of, rather than
contingent upon, each other.”30 This creates a divisible bundle of rights
that can be allocated in numerous combinations.31
Conceptualizing citizenship rights as a disaggregated group of
rights allows for a more complete and nuanced analysis of the
allocation of citizenship rights. This approach to citizenship rights is
explored by legal scholars Linda Bosniak and Rose Cuison Villazor,
and political scientist Elizabeth Cohen. Bosniak’s work on the
“citizenship of aliens” illustrates that noncitizens in most liberal
democratic societies “are routinely entitled to a broad range of
important civil and social rights—rights that are commonly described
in the language of citizenship.”32 These rights include “full due
process rights in criminal proceedings, . . . expressive, associational,
and religious freedom rights, . . . the protections of the state’s labor and
employment laws, and to the right to education and other social
benefits.”33 Akin to the arguments made by postnational scholars,
Bosniak notes that these rights are available to noncitizens based on
their territorial presence and personhood.34 These are human rights
within the human-resident-membership rights typology. Yet unlike
most postnational scholars, Bosniak explicitly acknowledges that
territorial presence and personhood do not give rise to immigrationrelated rights.35 Bosniak implicitly differentiates between human rights
and membership rights when she explains that noncitizens “always
remain subject to potential deportation.”36
Villazor’s work on “interstitial citizenship” similarly illustrates
that individuals without citizenship status enjoy some citizenship
rights.37 Villazor’s work focuses on the rights of American nationals.

30. Villazor, supra note 13, at 1720-21; see also COHEN, supra note 13, at 6 (“an
intertwining set or ‘braid’ of fundamental civil, political, and social rights, along with rights
of nationality.”).
31. See COHEN, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that “[n]umerous configurations are
conceivable”); BENHABIB, supra note 13, at 1.
32. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 34.
33. Id.
34. BOSNIAK, supra note 4, at 459.
35. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 34.
36. Id.
37. See Villazor, supra note 13.
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National is a legal status that is distinct from citizen and alien, and
nationals have citizenship rights that are not the same as either citizens
or aliens. For example, like citizens, federal immigration law does not
apply to nationals because they are not aliens, but like aliens, nationals
are not eligible to vote in federal, state, or local elections because they
are not citizens.38 By analyzing the rights of American nationals
Villazor demonstrates that “citizenship rights may be disentangled
from formal citizenship and that citizenship is far more fluid and
malleable than its conventional framing suggests.”39 In describing
nationals as interstitial citizens Villazor illustrates that citizenship
rights are in fact a bundle of rights that can be disaggregated.40
Cohen’s work on semi-citizenship not only demonstrates that
citizenship rights can be, and often are, disaggregated and decoupled
from citizenship status, but she also explains why this happens. Cohen
explains that “because rights create political relationships it is crucial to
states that they be able to disaggregate bundles of rights.”41
Disaggregating citizenship rights allows states to shape and manage
“populations whose diverse elements could not all be governed by a
single set of rules.”42 Membership status is one way of organizing the
population that accounts for relevant diverse elements. Disaggregating
citizenship rights gives rise to what Cohen terms, semi-citizenship.43
Semi-citizens are individuals who are only accorded a subset of the
fundamental civil, political, and social rights granted to citizens.44 It is
possible to disaggregate citizenship rights because they are “an
intertwining set or ‘braid’ of fundamental civil, political, and social
rights, along with rights of nationality.”45 These rights not only
become unbraided from each other, but each individual strand can fray.
Types of citizenship rights can become disaggregated from one another
and from their constituent parts. This suggests that citizenship rights
are independent of, rather than contingent upon, each other; that is,
each right exists because it is valuable in itself, not become it makes
the exercise of other rights possible.46
Cohen’s state-centric approach to explaining the existence of
disaggregated citizenship rights provides a basis for understanding the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1675-76.
Id. at 1678-79.
Id. at 1679.
COHEN, supra note 13, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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development of citizenship rights for noncitizens in the European
Union. The desire to facilitate immigrant incorporation and the belief
that secure legal rights enable immigrants to achieve the same
economic and social outcomes as citizens would lead states to grant
immigrants citizenship rights. However, states may still want to
differentiate between individuals with different levels of connection or
commitment to the state and grant these groups different combinations
of rights. The European Union approach to noncitizen rights reflects a
disaggregated approach in which rights are varied based on perceived
commitment and connection to the state.
Bosniak’s, Villazor’s, and Cohen’s work theoretically explain and
empirically demonstrate the disaggregation of citizenship rights and the
decoupling of these rights from citizenship status. The remaining parts
of this article build on these theoretical insights to analyze the creation
of a new citizenship rights regime to facilitate immigrant incorporation
in the European Union. Contrary to the empirical claims made by
postnational scholars, it is my contention that postnational citizenship
only exists with regard to “citizenship within the community,” it has no
bearing on “citizenship at the border.” Noncitizens are granted human
rights within the postnational citizenship model, but immigrationrelated rights continue to be membership rights that are coupled with
citizenship status. While such rights are not as tightly coupled to
citizenship status as they are in the United States, postnational
citizenship scholars fail to acknowledge that access to these rights
continues to be dependent upon national cultural belonging, which does
little to alter noncitizens’ access to membership rights.
II. POSTNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal’s groundbreaking 1994 book, LIMITS OF
CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN
EUROPE, argued that noncitizens within Europe had a variety of
citizenship rights despite their lack of citizenship status. Soysal named
this new development postnational citizenship because citizenship
rights were available “based on universal personhood rather than
national belonging.”47 Soysal argues that this “new and more universal
concept of citizenship” unfolded in the post-war era.48 A defining
feature of this new citizenship model is that rights that were previously

47. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1 (the traditional model national citizenship is “anchored
in territorialized notions of cultural belonging”); see also JACOBSON, supra note 6, at vii, 23.
48. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1.
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exclusively available to citizens are now available to noncitizens
through the rubric of personal rights or human rights.49 Soysal uses the
post-World War II experience of guestworkers in European countries
to demonstrate that noncitizens have experienced social, political, and
economic incorporation in their states of residence.50 Guestworkers’
social, political, and economic participation in their countries of
residence defies traditional understandings about distinctions drawn
between citizens and noncitizens. Soysal notes that guestworkers
“participate in the educational system, welfare schemes, and labor
markets” and they “join trade unions, take part in politics through
collective bargaining and associational activity, and sometimes vote in
local elections.”51
The traditional model of citizenship—national citizenship—is
described as being “anchored in territorialized notions of cultural
belonging.”52 Soysal describes this approach to citizenship as defining
“bounded populations, with a specific set of rights and duties,
excluding ‘others’ on the grounds of nationality.”53 Pursuant to this
citizenship model immigrants had to become national citizens before
they would have the bundle of rights exclusively available to citizens.54
The experience of guestworkers, however, demonstrates that
noncitizens have a variety of rights within their states of residence
despite lacking citizenship status.55 This new model of citizenship—
postnational citizenship—makes rights previously exclusively available
to national citizens available based on personhood. Soysal explains
that postnational citizenship “confers upon every person the right and
duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a
polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that
community.”56
Soysal correctly contends that “individual rights, historically
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1-2. Throughout this article the terms integration and incorporation are used
interchangeably to refer to the participation of noncitizens in the society of residence in
manner that is indistinguishable from native-born citizens. PORTES & RUMBAUT,
IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13, 232–41; ALBA & NEE, supra note 11, at 5–6,
11–13 (2003); PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 11, at 46–48 (2001); Banks,
supra note 11 (“Immigrant incorporation is achieved when immigrants are integrated into
U.S. society such that it is difficult to differentiate their legal protections, access to public
resources, educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities from those of nativeborn citizens.”).
51. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 3 (“immigrants were expected to be molded into national citizens”).
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 3.
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defined on the basis of nationality, are increasingly codified into a
different scheme that emphasizes universal personhood.”57 Yet the
rights that noncitizens have by virtue of their personhood are limited.
Access to two additional categories of rights, resident rights and
membership rights, remain contingent on factors other than
personhood. For example, Soysal’s discussion of entry and residence
exclaims that “[b]y the 1980s, well over half the foreigners in Europe
already had permanent residency in their host countries—a virtually
irrevocable status carrying with it varying rights and privileges of
membership.”58 Yet this immigration status, and the corresponding
rights, is not available based on personhood. It is available based on
lawful residence in the state, and post-2000 it is conditioned on
demonstrating civic integration. A similar situation exists for the
social, economic, and political rights Soysal discusses. She notes that
for social rights it is legal status and physical presence that are “the
most important factors” in determining rights.59 Economic activity
rights are similarly based on immigration status. Soysal explains that
immigration status categories “impose the principal constraints on
migrants’ exercise of economic rights. They determine the scope of
noncitizens’ engagement in professions and trades and their access to
labor markets.”60 Soysal concludes by noting that “once migrants are
in and established as legal permanent residents, they are entitled to take
up any gainful activity.”61 Soysal tends to focus on the rights of legal
permanent residents to demonstrate that citizenship status is not
dispositive in determining an individual’s rights. Yet legal permanent
resident status is not available based on personhood, and it is
increasingly only available to individuals who can demonstrate national
cultural belonging.62 Thus immigrants’ access to citizenship looks
more like the traditional citizenship model than the postnational
citizenship model Soysal introduces.
III. RIGHTS AND INCORPORATION
Immigrant incorporation is the process by which immigrants are
incorporated into the host society “such that it is difficult to
differentiate their legal protections, access to public resources,
educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities from those
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 136.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 126.
See infra Part IV.
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of native-born citizens.”63 Naturalization is often viewed as an
important part of the immigrant incorporation process because it can be
the basis for obtaining rights that facilitate equitable access to public
resources employment, or educational outcomes.
Alternatively,
naturalization can mark the culmination of the incorporation process.
For postnational citizenship scholars, naturalization is not a
critical part of the incorporation process. Migrants have access to
citizenship rights, rights that facilitate incorporation, based on their
personhood rather than their citizenship status. Citizenship rights are
important for immigrant incorporation because legal rights are part of
the context of reception that immigrants encounter. An immigrants’
context of reception is the “structural and institutional features of the
specific contexts that immigrants enter,” which “influence their
experiences and opportunities for mobility.”64 Social scientists have
examined four distinct dimensions of immigrants’ context of
reception—government policy, labor market conditions, existing ethnic
or national communities, and reactions from the native population.65
These aspects of an immigrants’ context of reception shape the
“framework of economic opportunities and legal options available to
migrants once they arrive.”66 Postnational citizenship scholars contend
that legal rights play a critically important role in immigrant
incorporation. Law determines who can be admitted to a state, a
migrant’s legal status within the host state, and the migrant’s “access to
social and economic resources.”67 Sociologists Alejandro Portes and
Rubén G. Rumbaut explain that law is “the first stage of the process of
incorporation because it affects the probability of successful
immigration and the framework of economic opportunities and legal
options available to migrants once they arrive.”68
Many postnational citizenship scholars are excited about a
membership model in which rights “previously defined as national
rights become entitlements legitimized on the basis of personhood.”69
Soysal explains that “[p]ostnational citizenship confers upon every

63. Banks, supra note 11, at 1159; see also ALBA & NEE, supra note 11, at 11–13;
PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13, 232–41; PORTES &
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 11, at 46–48.
64. MARROW, supra note 12, at 9. Immigrant incorporation is also shaped by
immigrants’ “individual characteristics [and] motivations.”
65. Banks, supra note 11, at 1169 (citing Marrow, supra note 12, at 233; PORTES &
RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 92-93).
66. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 93.
67. Banks, supra note 11, at 1171.
68. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 93.
69. See, e.g., SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3.
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person the right and duty of participation in authority structures and
public life of a polity regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that
community.”70 Such a model of membership would support immigrant
incorporation by ensuring immigrants equal access to economic and
social resources, providing confidence that immigrants will be able to
remain in their state of residence to reap the benefits of their material
and non-material investments in their state of residence, and
guaranteeing the ability of immigrants’ family members to join them so
that they can enjoy the comfort and support that comes from living
together as a family. However, the postnational citizenship model is
unable to achieve these goals because immigration-related rights, the
right to work, and political participation rights are not allocated based
on personhood. Rather these rights are allocated based on connections
to the State like residence, family, and culture.
Before turning to an analysis of five rights that are important for
immigrant incorporation, the next section explains the unique situation
of non-European migrants within Europe. With the creation of
European Union citizenship in 1992, non-European citizens faced the
possibility of being excluded from the rights allocated by the European
Union because they lacked citizenship status in EU member states.71
This concern led to the enactment of secondary law that allocated
citizenship rights to non-European migrants.72 This secondary law is
an important source of rights that postnational citizenship scholars
point to as evidence of the creation of postnational citizenship. This
body of law goes a long way in creating a rights regime in which the
rights of European citizens and non-European citizens are
indistinguishable as claimed by postnational citizenship scholars.
However, in the areas of immigration-related rights, economic rights,
and political participation rights, the rights of non-European migrants
are limited, or are conditioned on demonstrating civic integration.
Returning to Bosniak’s discussion of citizenship, this secondary law
implements the universalist principle of “citizenship within the
community,” but not “citizenship at the border.”
A. Third-Country Nationals
European Union member states faced a challenge regarding the
membership status of first, second, and third generation immigrants
70. Id.
71. See e.g., Michael A. Becker, Managing Diversity in the European Union: Inclusive
European Citizenship and Third-Country Nationals, 7 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS &
DEVELOPMENT J. 132, 137-38 (2004).
72. Id.
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who were long-term residents. A troubling number of these individuals
did not have citizenship status in their states of residence despite longterm residence within the country.73 For example, Rogers Brubaker
noted in his 1992 study of citizenship in Germany and France that
“nearly half a million second-generation Turkish immigrants, born and
raised in Germany, remain outside the community of citizens.”74 This
reflected the sense that citizenship in Germany “refer[e]d to a
‘community of descent’, with little regard for birthplace and
residence.”75 Administrative regulations explicitly stated that “the
Federal Republic is not a country of immigration [and] does not strive
to increase the number of its citizens through naturalization.”76
Germany significantly revised its citizenship laws in 2000 and granted
birthright citizenship to the children of immigrants born within
Germany if at least one parent has resided in Germany lawfully for at
least eight years and has a right to permanent residence.77 Despite
changes in German citizenship law and the law of other European
Union member states, a significant number of non-European citizens
residing in the European Union were not citizens of their states of
residence.78
The legal status of these individuals, referred to as third-country
nationals (“TCNs”), within the European Union presented a challenge
because EU law granted certain rights based on EU citizenship, which
is only available to the citizens of EU member states.79 Freedom of
73. Many of these immigrants’ birth within the Member States’ territory did not give
rise to citizenship within that Member State. See, e.g., Marc Morje´ Howard, The Causes
and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship Law, 17 GERMAN POLITICS 41, 42
(2008). Additionally the requirements for naturalization were often significant. For
example, before 2000 Germany required ten years’ residence and applicants had to renounce
their prior citizenship. Id. at 61, n. 71.
74. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY
75 (1992).
75. Howard, supra note 73, at 42.
76. BRUBAKER, supra note 74, at 77; see also Howard, supra note 73, at 42 (noting
that pre-2000 “German citizenship refer[e]d to a ‘community of descent’, with little regard
for birthplace and residence”).
77. Entry & Residence, Law on Nationality, GERMAN FED. FOREIGN OFFICE (last
http://www.auswaertigesvisited
Aug.
4,
2016),
amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/04_Recht/Staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht.html.
78. OECD/European Union, Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In 332
(2015), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issuesmigration-health/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-2015-settling-in_9789264234024en#.WW-tv4jyvZs.
79. When the Treaty on European Union was being considered there were proposals to
grant EU citizenship to third-country nationals, but they were resoundly rejected. Severine
Picard, The EU Constitutional Treaty: Towards A European Citizenship For Third Country
CONTEMP.
EUR.
RESEARCH
73,
74
(2005),
Nationals?,
1
J.
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/viewFile/8/7.

2017]

BRINGING CULTURE BACK

333

movement and other rights meant to facilitate the economic, political,
and social goals of the EU would not be available to TCNs unless EU
citizenship rights were extended to TCNs. Failing to develop a rights
regime for TCNs was viewed as problematic for at least four reasons.
First, TCNs made up a significant portion of the population within the
European Union. In 1998, 10 million TCNs lawfully resided in EU
member states.80 While this only accounted for four percent of the total
EU population, it represented a population larger than a number of EU
member states.81 Second, it legitimated the unequal treatment of ethnic
minorities. Most TCNs are “perceived as belonging to a visible
minority” because of their family name, mother tongue, religion, and
skin color.82 Thus, ethnic minorities and TCNs are often one in the
same within EU member states and the allocation of rights based on
citizenship status unintentionally limits the rights of ethnic minorities.
Third, TCNs were long-term residents who were settled within the EU
and would not be leaving. Contrary to the perception of many EU
member states that the States were not countries of immigration, they
had become just that. While the large-scale migration that took place
post-World War II was viewed as temporary for decades, by the
beginning of the twenty-first century it became impossible to continue
to view migrants as temporary workers who would return home. These
workers had settled in member states and had become a permanent part
of society.83 Finally, migration would continue such that the TCN
population will not disappear over time.84
The Council of the European Union (“the Council”) agreed that
the incorporation of TCNs who were long-term residents was an
important issue. In 1999, the Council concluded “the legal status of
third-country nationals should be approximated to that of member
states’ nationals.”85 One approach offered for accomplishing this was
granting TCNs who reside within a member state for a period of time
and have a long-term residence permit “a set of uniform rights which
are as near as possible to those enjoyed by citizens of the European
Union.”86 This began to come to life in 2004 when the Council enacted
80. Kees Groenendijk & Elspeth Guild, Converging Criteria: Creating an Area of
Security of Residence for Europe’s Third Country Nationals, 3 EUR. J. MIGRATION L. 37, 39
(2001).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 37.
84. Id. at 40.
85. Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, sec. 21 (Oct. 1516, 1999), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm .
86. Council Directive (EC) No. 109/2003 of 25 November 2003, art. 4(1), 2003 O.J. (L
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a directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are
long-term residents.87 This directive explained that the incorporation
of TCNs who are long-term residents was “a key element in promoting
economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective of the
Community stated in the Treaty.”88 Because of this commitment,
postnational citizenship scholars correctly identify the development of
a rights regime that is available to individuals based on something
other than national citizenship. Yet this regime is not based solely on
personhood.
EU member states are increasingly conditioning
immigration-related rights, economic rights, and political rights on
civic integration. Civic integration, like national cultural belonging,
requires migrants to demonstrate that they have adopted the member
state’s values, norms, and practices before gaining these rights.89
The remaining sections of this Part discuss noncitizens’ right to
enter, reside, remain, vote, work, and be educated in a state in which
they do not have citizenship status. This discussion illustrates that
access to these rights varies based on levels of national cultural
belonging measured by citizenship and immigration status.
B. Citizenship Rights in Practice
Citizenship rights are important for immigrant incorporation
because legal rights are part of the context of reception that immigrants
encounter. Four key aspects of immigrants’ context of reception are:
government policy, labor market conditions, existing ethnic or national
communities, and reactions from the native population.90 The
following sections examine the rights of TCNs in the areas of
immigration, employment, political participation, and education. This
discussion illustrates that none of these rights, except for education
rights, are available to noncitizens based on personhood, but rather
based on national cultural belonging in the form of civic integration.
1. The Right to Enter & Reside
The right to enter and remain within the territorial borders of a
state are rights that continue to be governed based on traditional
notions of state sovereignty. National citizens have an absolute right to
016) 44, whereas statement 2 (concerning the status of third-country nationals who are longterm residents) [hereinafter Long-Term Resident Council Directive].
87. Id.
88. Id. (whereas statement 4).
89. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
90. Banks, supra note 11, at 1169 (citing Marrow, supra note 12, at 233; PORTES &
RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 92-93).

2017]

BRINGING CULTURE BACK

335

enter their country of nationality, to reside there, and they cannot be
deported. The ability to enter a state to work or join family, to have
reasonable expectations about how long you can reside there, and to
know that only serious criminal activity will lead to deportation creates
a sense of security for immigrants. Such security allows immigrants to
invest material and non-material resources in the country of residence
that will enable them to achieve economic, social, and political
incorporation. In the parlance of the human-resident-membership
rights typology, the absolute right to enter and remain is a membership
right, a robust right to enter and reside is a resident right, and there is
no human right to enter and reside.91
a. EU Citizens
European Union citizens have freedom of movement, which gives
them the right to enter and reside within the territory of a member state
of which they are not a citizen.92 This state is referred to as the host
member state.93 The right to reside in a host member state for less than
three months is without conditions for EU citizens and their family
members.94 The only EU citizens who have a right to reside in a host
member state for more than three months are those who are workers or
self-employed, “have sufficient resources for themselves and their
family members not to become a burden on the social assistance
system of the host member state during their period of residence and
have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host member
state,” or are students and have comprehensive health insurance.95 EU
citizens have the right to reside in the host member state as long as the
conditions for residence continue to be satisfied.96 The rights that EU
citizens have to reside in a host member state are not absolute. Host
member states retain the right to restrict these individuals’ freedom of
movement and residence based on public policy, public safety, and
public health grounds.97 After residing in a host member state for five
years, an EU citizen has the right to permanent residence in the host

91. This article does not address the rights of refugees or an individual’s right to a
refugee determination within a state. The debates surrounding an individual’s right to enter
in the refugee and asylum context is beyond the scope of this article.
92. Council Directive 2004/38, arts. 5-6, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 91-92 (EC).[hereinafter
EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive].
93. See e.g., id.
94. Id. at art. 6. The EU citizens and their family members only need to have a valid
identification card or passport.
95. Id. at art. 7.
96. Id. at art. 14(2).
97. Id. at art. 27.
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member state.98
b. Third-country nationals
TCNs’ ability to enter and reside in an EU member state is
dictated by domestic law.99 Once a TCN obtains long-term resident
status, however, that individual has a robust right to enter and reside in
the country granting that status. Long-term resident status is available
to TCNs who “have resided legally and continuously within its territory
for five years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant
application” pursuant to a Council Directive.100 Member states must
require TCNs to demonstrate that they have “stable and regular
resources which are sufficient to maintain himself/herself and the
members of his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance
system of the Member State concerned” and health insurance.101
Finally, member states can require applicants to “comply with
integration conditions, in accordance with national law.”102 Once these
requirements have been satisfied, the TCN obtains long-term resident
status within the member state, which is a permanent status.103
Long-term residents have a limited right to enter and reside in a
member state other than the one that granted long-term resident status.
This state is referred to as the second member state.104 The long-term
resident’s ability to enter and reside in a second member state is
contingent on the individual engaging in economic activity (employed
or self-employed capacity), pursuing educational studies or vocational
training, or other specified purposes.105 These rights are not absolute
because the second member state can limit the number of long-term
residents from other member states allowed to enter and reside
98. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 16(1).
99. See e.g., FRA EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUND. RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON
EUROPEAN LAW RELATING TO ASYLUM, BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION 26, 40 (2014),
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/handbook-european-law-relating-asylum-bordersand-immigration [hereinafter European Law Handbook].
100. Long-Term Residents Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 3(2). The directive
excludes individuals pursuing educational studies or vocational training, those who have
applied for, or have been granted, temporary protection, and those who have applied for, or
have been granted, “a subsidiary form of protection in accordance with international
obligations, national legislation or the practice of the Member States.”.
101. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 5(1).
102. Id. at art. 5(2). See infra Part IV(C) for a more detailed discussion about the use of
integration requirements.
103. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 8(1)-(2) (noting the
Member State shall issue an EC residence permit that is valid for at least five years, and is
automatically renewed upon expiry).
104. Id. at art. 2(d).
105. Id. at art. 14(2).
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“provided that such limitations are already set out for the admission of
third-country nationals in the existing legislation at the time of the
adoption of this Directive.”106 Long-term residents who reside in a
second member state are required to obtain a residence permit no later
than three months after entering the second member state.107 The
second member state can require the long-term resident to demonstrate
that they have “stable and regular resources which are sufficient to
maintain themselves and the members of their families, without
recourse to the social assistance system of the Member State
concerned” and health insurance.108 The second member state can also
require the long-term resident to comply with integration measures.109
Any requirement to satisfy integration requirements will not apply to
long-term residents who had to satisfy integration requirements to
obtain their long-term residence permit in the first member state.110
However, the second member state can require the long-term resident
to attend language courses.111 The second member state can also refuse
a long-term residence application when the applicant “constitutes a
threat to public policy or public security.”112 In making the decision to
deny a long-term residence application, the second member state is
directed to “consider the severity or type of offence against public
policy or public security committed by the long-term resident.”113
c. Derivative Rights
The family members of EU citizens and long-term resident TCNs
have a derivative right to enter the territory of EU member states.114
The derivative right to enter the territory of member states stems from
the European Union citizen’s or long-term resident’s right to free
movement. The first rules adopted on the free movement of workers
gave workers the right to be accompanied by their spouse, children
under twenty-one years old, dependent children over twenty-one years
old, and dependent parents and grandparents.115 The Free Movement
Directive explicitly stated, “irrespective of their nationality” these

106. Id. at art. 14(4).
107. Id. at art. 15(1).
108. Id. at art. 15(2).
109. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86,. at art. 15(3).
110. Id. at art. 15(3).
111. Id. at art. 15(3).
112. Id. at art. 17(1).
113. Id. at art. 17(1).
114. Council Directive 86/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Family
Reunification Council Directive].
115. See European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 119-20
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family members “have the right to install themselves with a worker
who is a national of one member state and who is employed in the
territory of another member state.”116 Similar rights were extended to
the family members of long-term resident TCNs because they have a
similar freedom to move throughout the European Union.117 The rights
of family members to enter the territory of a state in which an EU
citizen or long-term resident is working was based on the idea that if
workers could not move with their family members the worker’s
freedom of movement would be restricted.118
European Union citizens’ and long-term residents’ freedom of
movement created a derivative right of entry for their family members.
Yet this right only existed when the EU citizen or long-term resident
was working in a state other than their state of citizenship or the state
that granted long-term resident status. This led to a situation in which
EU citizens residing within their state of citizenship and long-term
residents residing within the state that granted long-term resident status
had fewer rights to live with their non-citizen family members.
Paradoxically, in many EU Member States EU nationals exercising
free movement rights enjoy far greater rights to family reunification
than the states’ own nationals do. Family reunification for EU
nationals who have not made use of free movement rights is
regulated by national law, which remains more restrictive in some
119
EU Member States.

The European Court of Justice addressed two aspects of this issue
in 2014. First, in O v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel
and Minister voor Immigratie, Integatie en Asiel v. B, the court held
that when EU citizens return to their country of citizenship after
exercising their free movement rights in another member state, their
116. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 10(1).
117. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114 (whereas statements).
118. See European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 120. For long-term residents, the
second member state can, but is not required, to authorize the entry and residence of other
family members like dependent parents, dependent adult children, and unmarried partners.
Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 16(2). The admission of
family members can be made contingent upon providing evidence that they “have resided as
members of the family of the long-term resident in the first member state,” “have stable and
regular resources which are sufficient to maintain themselves without recourse to the social
assistance system of the Member State concerned or that the long-term resident has such
resources and insurance for them” and health insurance. Id. at art. 16(4). The family
members, like the long-term resident, can be denied entry if they “constitute[] a threat to
public policy or public security.” Id. at art. 17(1). As with the long-term resident, the
second member state is required to “consider the severity or type of offence against public
policy or public security committed by the long-term resident or his/her family member(s),
or the danger that emanates from the person concerned.” Id. at art. 17(2).
119. European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 120.
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family members have a derivative right of entry and residence in the
EU citizen’s state of origin.120 The court interpreted a number of EU
directives and concluded that depriving EU citizens of the ability to
return to their state of citizenship with family members, when those
familial relationships were created while exercising their free
movement rights, would restrict the citizen’s freedom of movement.121
Second, in S & G v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, the
court similarly held that the same derivative right to enter and reside
exists for third-country national family members of EU citizens when
“the citizen resides in [their state of citizenship] but regularly travels to
another Member State as a worker.”122 The derivative rights to enter
and reside are only available to the family members of EU citizens and
long-term resident third-country nationals. These rights are not based
on personhood, but rather family connections to citizens and
individuals with the long-term resident immigration status.
d. Third-country nationals who are not long-term residents
For third-country nationals who are not long-term residents, their
right to enter and reside within an EU member state is based on
national law. While there is an EU Directive outlining the rights of
TCNs workers within the EU, it only applies to those who are legally
residing and authorized to work pursuant to national law or practice.123
The family members of TCNs who are not long-term residents, but are
authorized to enter and reside pursuant to national law, also have a
derivative right of entry and residence.124 The derivative rights only
exist for the spouse and minor children of TCNs that have a residence
permit issued by a member state that is valid for one year or more and
“who has reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent
residence.”125 Member states can require children over the age of
120. Case C-456/12, O. v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integatie en Asiel & Minister voor
Immigratie, Integatie en Asiel v. B., 2014 E.C.R. 135, at para. 50.
121. Id.
122. Case C-457/12, S & G v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014
E.C.R. 136, at para. 44.
123. Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of
rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, 2011 O.J. L343/1,
(2011) [hereinafter Third-Country Nationals Directive].
124. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at 12.
125. Id. at art 3-4. These rights do not extend to individuals who have applied for, or
have been granted, temporary protection, and those who have applied for, or have been
granted, “a subsidiary form of protection in accordance with international obligations,
national legislation or the practice of the Member States.” Id. at art. 3(2). Other family
members, such as dependent parents, dependent adult children, and unmarried partners may
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twelve who “arrive[] independently from the rest of his/her family” to
satisfy integration requirements provided for in existing legislation.126
Member states can also deny these family members entry and the
ability to reside on grounds of public policy, public security, and public
health.127
The ability of noncitizens to enter and reside in a country that is
not their country of nationality is significantly limited. The United
States treats the admission and residence of noncitizens as a
privilege.128 United States federal law outlines who is eligible for
admission and residence, but no noncitizen has the right to enter and
reside in the United States; not even the spouse or noncitizen children
of a United States citizen.129 European Union citizens have the right to
enter and reside in member states that are not their state of nationality,
and those rights extend to specified family members. However, even
EU citizens’ right is not absolute. Host member states may prevent the
entry and residence of other European Union citizens (and their family
members) if those individuals pose a threat to public policy, public
safety, or public health. Third-country nationals that have obtained
long-term residence within a member state have similar rights to move
throughout the European Union, but the initial grant of long-term
residence status is based on national law. Additionally, the initial entry
of third-country nationals into EU member states is based exclusively
on national law. Neither international law nor regional law is playing a
role in granting these noncitizens the ability to enter or reside in a state
other than their state of nationality. This is an area in which national
sovereignty remains quite strong and absolute. Thus, the right to enter
and reside for noncitizens are resident and membership rights rather
than human rights. These rights are only available to individuals with
certain immigration statuses and citizens.
2. The Right to Remain
The right to remain, or the right not to be deported, is another
right that traditionally has been limited to individuals with citizenship
status. Only those individuals who are considered full members of the
national community have been granted the right to remain and

be admitted to join the third-country national, but it is not required. Id. at art. 4(2-3).
126. Id. at art. 4(1).
127. Note that second Member States cannot deny a long-term resident’s family
members entry and residence based on public health. Long-Term Resident Council
Directive, supra note 86, at art. 17-18.
128. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
129. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1153.
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protection against deportation, removal, or expulsion. Post-World War
II the status conferring full membership within a State has been
citizen.130 While noncitizens do not have an absolute right to remain in
a state of which they are not a citizen, deportation is regulated by law.
Domestic law articulates the specific grounds upon which a noncitizen
can be deported and domestic law and international human rights law
specify the procedures that must be followed in doing so. These laws
also protect noncitizens against arbitrary deportation and collective
deportation.131 The United States and European countries protect the
ability of noncitizens to remain differently. In the United States, all
noncitizens are subject to the statutory deportation grounds. It does not
matter what one’s immigration status is, or how long one has resided in
the United States.132 All that matters is that one is not a United States
citizen. This approach is softened with the availability of discretionary
relief from deportation. Immigration judges have discretion within
certain boundaries to cancel a deportation order and allow the
noncitizen to remain in the United States with lawful immigration
status.133 Due to concerns within Congress in the 1990s that
immigration judges were exercising discretion favorably on behalf of
noncitizens too frequently, fewer noncitizens are eligible for
discretionary relief.134 The European approach is different. Length of
residence and immigration status determine which deportation grounds
are applicable. The longer one has resided as a lawful resident the
fewer deportation grounds apply. Personhood is not the basis for
providing protection against deportation, rather it is citizenship, length
of residence, and immigration status. Thus, the robust right to remain
in EU member states should be viewed as a resident right and the
absolute right to remain as a membership right.
While proportionality is institutionalized in deportation
proceedings throughout Europe, national citizens are the only
individuals with absolute protection against deportation. All other
rights protecting noncitizens from deportation are limited; thus,
national citizenship remains the “main determinant of individual rights

130. At earlier times in American and European history full membership has been based
on local affiliations.
131. See, e.g., Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other than Those
Already Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol Thereto, art. 4, Sep. 16, 1963,
E.T.S. No. 46.
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
134. See Banks, supra note 11.
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and privileges” in the deportation context, contrary to Soysal's claim.135
The limited rights that safeguard third-country nationals from
deportation, however, are significant and they provide substantially
more protection than is available in the United States.
Pursuant to EU law, there are three main categories of protection
against deportation for EU citizens and their third-country national
family members residing outside of the EU citizen’s state of
citizenship. First, deportation decisions based on public policy or
public security must “take account of considerations such as how long
the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state
of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration
into the host member state and the extent of his/her links with the
country of origin.”136 Second, EU citizens and their family members
with the right to permanent residence can only be deported based on
“serious grounds of public policy or public security.”137 Finally, EU
citizens and their family members who have resided in a host member
state for ten years and minors cannot be deported except for
“imperative grounds of public security.”138 Long-term resident TCNs
have similar protections. They can only be deported when they
constitute “an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or
public security.”139 Before a long-term resident can be deported
pursuant to this provision, the member state must consider the length of
time of residence, the person’s age, the consequences for the long-term
resident and their family, and the person’s “links with the country of
residence or the absence of links with the country of origin.”140
The use of a proportionality analysis to limit the deportation of
EU citizens, their family members, and TCN long-term residents is
based on the right to private life and family life. This right is protected
pursuant to domestic law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, and Council
Directives.141 There is robust European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) jurisprudence on the interaction between a noncitizen’s
right to private life and family life and a state’s sovereign authority to
deport noncitizens.142 Article 8 of the European Convention on the
135. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 12.
136. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 28(1).
137. Id. at art. 28(2).
138. Id. at art. 28(3).
139. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 12(1).
140. Id. at art. 12(3).
141. See, e.g., European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 117.
142. See Chair and J.B. v. Germany, App. No. 69735/01, HUDOC (2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int; Kaya v. Germany, App. No. 31753/02, HUDOC (2007),
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Protection of Human Rights states, “[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”143
Any interference with this right must be “in accordance with the law”
and “necessary in a democratic society.”144 The ECtHR has interpreted
“necessary in a democratic society” to mean a measure that is “justified
by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued.”145 Within the deportation context the ECtHR
reviews a deportation order to see if the “legitimate [State] aim
pursued” and the “seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s
right to respect for their family life” have been appropriately
balanced.146 The State aim involved is generally preventing disorder as
most third-party nationals are ordered deported based on criminal
convictions.147 Noncitizens have argued that the “seriousness of the
interference” with private and/or family life was evident in the fact that
deportation would separate them from their spouse, partner, children,
parents or siblings, and that it “would be unreasonable for their family
http://www.echr.coe.int; Maslov v. Austria, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2007); Sezen v. The
Netherlands, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2006); Üner v. The Netherlands, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14
(2006); Lupsa v. Romania, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (2006); Keles v. Germany, 44 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 12 (2005); Radovanovic v. Austria, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 (2004); Jakupovic v. Austria,
38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 (2003); Mokrani v. France, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2003); Slivenko v.
Latvia, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (2003); Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 (2002);
Yildiz v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2002); Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00,
HUDOC (2002), http://www.echr.coe.int; Ezzouhdi v. France, App. No. 47160/99, HUDOC
(2001), http://www.echr.coe.int; Bensaid v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 (2001);
Boultif v. Switzerland, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2001); Baghli v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32
(1999); Bouchelkia v. France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686 (1999); El Boujaïdi v. France, 30 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 223 (1999); Mehemi v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739 (1999); Dalia v. France, 33
Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 (1998); Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 419 (1997); Boughanemi v.
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228 (1996); C v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (1996); Nasri v.
France, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458 (1995); Lamguindaz v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep.
213 (1993); Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 801 (1992); Moustaquim v. Belgium,
13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 (1991); Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 (1988);
see also Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Political Question or Legal Issue?, 27 GA.
STATE. U. LAW REV. 489-563 (2011).
143. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221].
144. Id. at art. 8(2) (stating the interference must be “necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
145. Moustaquim v. Belgium, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, at para. 43 (1991); see also
Berrehab, supra note 142, at para 29.
146. Berrehab, supra note 142.
147. See Banks, supra note 142, at 532. The third-country nationals were ordered
deported for criminal convictions running the spectrum of assault, burglary, drug trafficking,
and rape. See, e.g., Beldjoudi, supra note 142; Aoulmi v. France, App. No. 50278/99,
HUDOC (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int; Amrollahi supra note 142; Baghli v. France, 33
Eur. H.R. 32; Bouchelkia supra note 142.
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members to join them in their state of nationality because of language
barriers, economic opportunities, or distance from non-nuclear family
members.”148 In conducting this proportionality review the ECtHR
weighs the state’s interest in public safety against the “noncitizen’s
affiliation with the state of residence, but also with his or her state of
nationality.”149 In seventeen out of twenty-eight cases decided between
1988 and mid-2008, the ECtHR held that the state had violated a thirdcountry national’s right to family life by ordering deportation.150
The right to private life and family life is a right that is available
based on personhood—it is available to all noncitizens. However, the
ability of this right to limit a State’s power to deport a noncitizen
depends on the noncitizen’s length of residence and immigration status.
Adjudicators seek to balance the noncitizen’s interest in remaining in
the state of residence and the State’s interest in protecting sovereign
interests like public security. This type of proportionality analysis
provides a great deal of protection to certain noncitizens, but it does not
create an absolute right to remain. That right is only available to
citizens. Thus, a robust right to remain in EU member states should be
viewed as a resident right and the absolute right to remain as a
membership right.
3. Economic Activity Rights
An individual’s ability to work or engage in self-employment
depends on their citizenship status and immigration status. For citizens
this right is absolute, however domestic law may limit the types of
work that an individual can perform.151 For noncitizens, this right
depends on the permission that was granted upon entry. Economic
activity rights should be classified as resident rights and membership
rights. Limited economic activity rights are resident rights and the
more robust economic activity rights are membership rights because
personhood is not the basis by which these rights are allocated. Once
noncitizens are granted permission to work within a specific state they
are generally granted the same protections as citizen workers. For
example, protection against discrimination and the protection of
workplace safety regulations.152 However, states can and do limit
access to certain jobs based on citizenship status. For example, in the
United States state governments can limit state government jobs to U.S.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Banks, supra note 142, at 528.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 538-39.
For example, in the United States sex work is illegal in most jurisdictions.
See, e.g., European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 184-85.
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citizens if the job “go[es] to the heart of representative government.”153
The United States Supreme Court has held that peace officers, state
troopers, and school teachers are such jobs.154 Similarly within the
European Union member states can restrict noncitizens’ access to jobs
that involve “the exercise of public authority” and safeguarding the
general public interest.155
Unlike other rights that are key for immigrant incorporation,
postnational citizenship scholars acknowledge that the right to work is
not a right that is based on personhood. Soysal states that “a person’s
specific legal status as a noncitizen is the most important [factor]” that
determines a noncitizen’s right to engage in economic activity.156
Because citizenship and immigration status dictate access to this right,
it is best viewed as a membership right in its most robust form and a
resident right in its weaker form.
Within the European Union citizenship status and immigration
status dictate a noncitizen’s access to the labor market. Access to
employment is regulated differently for EU citizens and TCNs. EU
citizens’ freedom of movement includes the right to nondiscrimination
in the employment context.157 Thus, EU citizens have equal access to
the labor market in any EU member state. However, there is a public
service exception.158 Additionally, an EU citizens’ right to work in a
member state of which he or she is not a national can be limited based
on public policy, public security, and public health.159
Third-country nationals’ ability to work within the European
Union is shaped by three factors: familial relationship with an EU
citizen, length of residence, and immigration status. When an EU
citizen exercises their freedom of movement and resides in a host
member state, their third-country family members have the right to
work in the host member state as well.160 Long-term residents are
entitled to the same access to the labor market as EU citizens.161 Longterm residents’ family members are able to work within the European
153. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
154. Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 434-35 (1997) (citing Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432
(1982) (peace officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 69-72 (1979) (school teachers);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1978) (state troopers)).
155. EC Council Directive, supra note 23.
156. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 125-26.
157. EU Treaty, supra note 23.
158. Id. at art. 45(4).
159. Id. at art. 45(2).
160. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 23.
161. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 11(1)(a).
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Union, but each member state determines the conditions for such
employment.162 Member states are also free to restrict third-country
nationals’ parents’ and adult unmarried children’s access to the labor
market.163
For TCNs who do not qualify for long-term residence, the right to
work is dictated by the terms of entry. For example, TCNs with a Blue
Card have limited access to the labor market for two years, and then
they have equal access to “highly qualified employment” for the
remainder of their stay within the European Union.164 The Blue Card
grants a TCN the right to enter and reside within a European Union
member state “for the purpose of highly qualified employment.”165
Highly qualified employment is a term of art defined as employment in
which the worker is protected as an employee, is paid, and has “higher
professional qualifications.”166 Blue Card holders can change their
employment within the first two years, but have to obtain prior
authorization by the relevant state authorities.167 After two years such
changes do not require prior authorization, but the Blue Card holder
must inform the proper authorities.168 Finally, TCN family members of
Blue Card holders have access to the labor market.169
TCN workers who are not engaged in “highly qualified
employment,” are granted access to the labor market for the “specific
employment activity authorized under” their entry and residence
permit.170 This is similar to the nonimmigrant visa category in the
United States. These noncitizens are entitled to equal treatment in
working conditions, health and safety workplace protections, freedom
of association and affiliation, and membership in an organization
If these workers qualify for family
representing workers.171
162. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at art. 14(2).
163. Id. at art. 14(3).
164. EC Council Directive, supra note 23, at art. 12(1). However, any restrictions that
apply to nationals, E.U. citizens, or EEA citizens also apply to Blue Card holders. Id. at art.
12(4).
165. Id. at art. 1(a).
166. Id. at art. 2(b).
167. Id. at art. 12(2).
168. Id. at art. 12(2).
169. Id. at art. 15(1); see also Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at
art. 14(1).
170. Council Directive 2004/38, arts. 5-6, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 91-92 (EC); Directive
2011/98/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 13 December 2011 on a
single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and
work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country
workers legally residing in a Member State, 2011 O.J. L343/1, art. 11(c) (2011) [hereinafter
Third-Country National Workers Directive].
171. Id. at art. 23(1).
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reunification, their family members are granted access to the labor
market, subject to certain conditions.172
Some TCNs are admitted to European Union member states for
seasonal work.173 Similar to the nonimmigrant visa category in the
United States, these noncitizens have the right to exercise the specific
employment activity specified in their entry and residence permit
during the period of their authorized stay.174 These noncitizens are
entitled to equal treatment with citizens for employment terms, the
right to “strike and take industrial action in accordance with host
member state’s national law,” back payments for outstanding
remuneration, and certain social security benefits.175
Noncitizens’ access to the labor market in EU member states is
based on their immigration status. The specific purpose for which a
noncitizen is admitted determines their access to the labor market.
Those noncitizens granted indefinite leave to reside are granted
economic activity rights that closely mirror those of citizens. All other
noncitizens’ access to the labor market and right to engage in economic
activity is determined based on actual labor market needs.
Noncitizens’ rights in this context closely mirror those of citizens when
the noncitizens’ connections to the state mirror those of citizens.
Absent such connections, the right to engage in economic activity is
limited and based on national sovereign interests.
Therefore,
noncitizens’ limited economic activity rights are resident rights and the
more robust economic activity rights are membership rights.
4. Political Participation Rights
Noncitizens’ ability to vote in national or local elections varies
widely across Europe. Only in the United Kingdom and Portugal are
TCNs able to vote in national elections.176 However, this right to vote
is limited to certain categories of TCNs. Access to local voting rights
is more common. European Union citizens have local voting rights
throughout Europe pursuant to the Treaty of Maastricht.177
Third-country nationals have local voting rights in fifteen
172. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at art. 14(1).
173. Directive 2014/36/EU of the Eur. Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2014 on the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Third-Country Nat’ls for the Purpose of Emp.
as Seasonal Workers, art. 3(2)(e), 2014 O.J. (L94) 36, (2014) [hereinafter TCNs Seasonal
Worker Directive].
174. Id. at art. 11(c).
175. Third-Country National Workers Directive, supra note 170, at art. 23(1).
176. International Key Findings, MIGRANT INTEGRATION POL’Y INDEX (2015),
http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings [hereinafter MIPEX].
177. EU Treaty, supra note 23.
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European countries.178 There are four common conditions used to
determine noncitizen voting rights. The conditions are duration of
residence, registration, residence status, or reciprocity.179 The required
period of residence ranges from three to five years. For example,
TCNs must reside in Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, and Sweden for three
years before being eligible to vote.180 The residence requirement is
four years in Finland and five years in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.181 Certain states require TCNs to register with local
authorities. In numerous countries, such as Ireland, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and Nordic states the registration process is
simple and mirrors that required of nationals when moving to a new
address.182 However, Belgium requires more than simple registration.
Applicants for voting rights must also “sign a declaration pledging
respect to the Belgium Constitution and legislation.”183 Another
condition for voting rights is permanent residence or long-term
residence status. For example, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia condition local voting rights on having this type of
residence status.184 Finally, certain states condition TCNs’ local voting
rights on reciprocity. TCNs from state A are allowed to vote in local
elections in state B if citizens of state B have similar voting rights in
state A.185 The Czech Republic, Malta, Portugal, and Spain all
condition voting rights on the existence of bilateral agreements
granting voting rights to their citizens.186 However, the Czech
Republic and Malta do not have any voting reciprocity agreements so
TCNs do not have local voting rights in these countries.187
More complex registration requirements, like those in Belgium,
and permanent or long-term residence status requirements limit voting
rights to TCNs who are able to demonstrate national cultural
178. Kees Groenendijk, Voting Rights for Nationals of Non-EU States,
BUNDESZENTRALE FÜR POLITISCHE BILDUNG (May 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/7HBY6H8M. TCNs obtain voting rights after three years in Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, and
Sweden. Id. After four years TCNs are eligible for local voting rights in Finland and after
five years in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id.
179. Id. at 4.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 4-5.
183. Id.
184. Groenendijk, supra note 178, at 5.
185. Id. (meaning that nationals of country A can vote in country B only if nationals of
country B can vote in country A, mostly on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the
two countries).
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id. Spain has one such agreement with Norway and Portugal has a number of such
agreements, adopting ten in recent years.
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belonging.188 In Belgium, national cultural belonging is measured
based on a pledge to respect the national constitution and national
laws.189 In countries that condition voting rights on residence status,
TCNs have had to demonstrate national cultural belonging in order to
obtain permanent residence or long-term residence status. As will be
discussed in Part III, before TCNs can obtain these residence statuses
they must demonstrate integration with regard to language, country
knowledge, and national values before obtaining permanent residence
or long-term residence status.190
The availability of voting rights is widely available to EU citizens
throughout Europe, but it is more restricted for TCNs.191 Voting rights
represent the most traditional form of political participation and noncitizen voting rights throughout Europe vary greatly.192 EU citizens
have local voting rights throughout Europe, but TCNs’ local voting
rights are conditioned on duration of residence, registration, residence
status, or reciprocity.193 Contrary to the claims of postnational
citizenship scholars, no European state grants TCNs voting rights based
on personhood. This type of political participation is conditioned on
national cultural belonging in states that have heightened registration
requirements and those that condition voting rights on long-term
residence status. Therefore, it is best to view voting rights as resident
rights or membership rights depending on the regime used to allocate
them. In countries that condition voting rights on residence or simple
registration requirements, voting rights should be viewed as a resident
right. For countries that condition voting rights on a status or
registration requirements that measure national cultural belonging,
voting rights should be viewed as membership rights.
5. Education Rights
Education is an important aspect of the immigrant incorporation
process. Education in western democracies not only provides
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4-5.
190. The countries are Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. MIPEX,
supra note 176. Groenendijk also notes that conditioning voting rights on permanent
residence or long-term residence status “may severely limit the number of third-country
nationals who can vote since the national governments in these countries grant the required
status infrequently or only to specific categories of immigrants (e.g., co-ethnics).”
Groenendijk, supra note 178, at 5.
191. Groenendijk, supra note 178, at 5.
192. Id.; Sarah Song, Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights, 13 CITIZENSHIP
STUDIES 607, 607-08 (2009).
193. Groenendijk, supra note 164, at 4.
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individuals with skills and knowledge necessary for participating in the
labor market, it also serves as an important site for socialization. This
is the one right discussed in this article that most conforms to the
claims made by postnational citizenship scholars. Access to primary
and secondary education is available based on personhood.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
guarantees all individuals, EU citizens and TCNs alike, a right to
education, which includes the right to “free compulsory education.”194
The language in this provision is universal, stating that “[e]veryone has
the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing
training.”195 Therefore, individuals who have long-term residence
status, Blue Card holders, seasonal workers, and other workers, along
with their family members, all have equal access to education and
vocational training.196 Pursuant to secondary EU law, “all thirdcountry national children in the EU, except those only present for a
short period of time, are entitled to access basic education.”197 This
right extends to TCN children who are unauthorized, but whose
deportation has been postponed.198
Unlike the right to enter, reside, remain, economic activity rights,
and political participation rights, education rights do conform to the
claims of postnational citizenship scholars because they are human
rights. Education rights are granted based on personhood and are
194. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art. 14 (The right to education “includes the
possibility to receive free compulsory education.”). The European Union Citizen Entry &
Residence Directive ensures that this right to education is realized for E.U. citizens residing
outside of their country of nationality. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note
92, at art. 24(1); see also EU Treaty, supra note 23, at arts. 149, 150.
195. EU Charter, supra note 176.
196. Long-Term Residence Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 11(1)(b); Family
Reunification Council Directive, supra note 111, at art. 14(1)(a); EC Council Directive,
supra note 23, at arts. 14(1)(c), 15(1) (granting family members the rights outlined in the
Family Reunification Directive & granting Blue Card holders equal treatment with nationals
of the host Member State with regard to education and vocational training); Third-Country
National Workers Directive, supra note 170, at art. 12(1)(c); Family Reunification Council
Directive, supra note 114, at arts. 3(1); TCNs Seasonal Worker Directive, supra note 173, at
art. 23(1)(g). The family members of other workers and seasonal workers have equal access
to education if they have a residence permit valid for one year or more and reasonable
prospect of obtaining a right of permanent residence. Family Reunification Council
Directive, supra note 114, at arts. 3(1), 14(1)(a). Other workers can be denied study and
maintenance grants and loans or other grants and loans, and they can be required to pay fees
for university and post-secondary education and vocational training that is “not directly
linked to the specific employment activity.” Third-Country National Workers Directive,
supra note 170, at art. 12(2)(a). Additionally, these workers can be required to demonstrate
language skills to access university and post-secondary education and vocational training.
Id.
197. European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 197.
198. Id.
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divorced from national cultural belonging. This is an important
development in the protection of citizenship rights, yet it is the
exception rather than the rule.
Despite the disaggregating of
citizenship rights and the decoupling of many of these rights from
citizenship status, the majority of the rights critical for immigrant
incorporation continue to be conditioned on national cultural
belonging.
IV. CIVIC INTEGRATION
Post-World War II Western liberal democratic states have
disaggregated citizenship rights, and the allocation of many of these
rights has been decoupled from citizenship status. At the time that
Soysal wrote her groundbreaking book, a growing number of rights
were being made available to noncitizens. Yet, since 1994 an
increasing number of EU member states are conditioning access to
long-term resident status on civic integration. Rights that are critical
for immigrant incorporation—the right to enter, reside, remain, work,
and vote—continue to be allocated based on national cultural
belonging rather than personhood. National cultural belonging has
been a basis for granting citizenship status, and it is increasingly
becoming a basis for granting long-term residence status. At least
fourteen EU member states require third-country nationals (“TCNs”) to
demonstrate integration with regard to language, country knowledge,
and national values before obtaining a legal status that grants them
citizenship rights.199 Six of these countries require certain TCNs to
demonstrate their integration before being allowed to enter the
country.200 As the previous section explains, it is long-term residence
status that enables noncitizens to have a robust set of citizenship rights
to facilitate their long-term integration.
This Part analyzes the national rules governing access to longterm residence status in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. The
focus is on these three countries because they are home to a significant
number of TCNs. In 2014, forty-six percent of long-term resident
TCNs arriving in Europe were in the Netherlands, France, and
199. These countries include Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
MIPEX, supra note 176.
200. Saskia Bonjour, The Transfer of Pre-Departure Integration Requirements for
Family Migrants among Member States of the European Union, 2 COMPARATIVE
MIGRATION STUDIES 205 (2014), https://www.imiscoe.org/journal-cms-2/comparativemigration-studies-2014-2/68-5-bonjour-s-2014-the-transfer-of-pre-departure-integrationrequirements-for-family-migrants-among-member-states-of-the-european-union/file.
The
countries are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
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Germany.201 These countries have also had different models of
immigrant integration.
The Dutch model has been termed
“multicultural” in which the state provides easy access to citizenship
status and recognizes the “right of ethnic minority groups to maintain
their cultural differences.”202 Scholars refer to the French model as
“assimilationist” because the state provides easy access to citizenship
status, “but requires from migrants a high degree of assimilation in the
public sphere and gives little to no recognition of their cultural
difference.”203 Finally, the German model has been described as
“segregationist” or “exclusive.”204 Within this model, migrants who
“do not share the ethnocultural background of the majority society” and
are excluded “from the political community.”205 Migrants are not
forced, however, “to give up their own cultures, and the state may even
actively promote such cultures and discourage assimilation to the
majority culture.”206 Despite decades of utilizing these different
models for immigrant integration, the Netherlands, France, and
Germany have come to adopt very similar integration requirements for
long-term residents.207 The analysis in this section demonstrates that
national cultural belonging remains an important basis for allocating
citizenship rights even as citizenship rights are disaggregated and
decoupled from citizenship status.
A. National Cultural Belonging
The postnational citizenship model distinguishes between
national-based conceptions of citizenship and postnational conceptions
of citizenship. The former are based on national identity, which
requires a historical or cultural tie to the state.208 Alternatively, a
postnational approach to belonging and citizenship is based on
201. Immigration, EUROSTAT (last visited Aug. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/RJ8H-LYYR.
202. RUUD KOOPMANS ET. AL., CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP: IMMIGRATION AND
CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN EUROPE 8 (2005).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 11.
206. Id. This model is based on the assumption that migrants will not become long-term
residents. Rather they will only remain as guest workers for a limited period of time.
Efforts to support migrants in maintaining the cultural heritage of their nationality was seen
as “facilitating their eventual repatriation.”
207. For countries like Germany this new approach to immigrant integration reflects
acceptance of the fact that TCNs are not guest workers who will return home after a short
stay.
208. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3 (“The model of national citizenship, anchored in
territorialized notions of cultural belonging, was dominant during the period of massive
migration at the turn of the century, when immigrants were expected to be molded into
national citizens.”).
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personhood.209 Postnational citizenship scholars contend that their
approach to citizenship allows a broader range of individuals to obtain
citizenship rights because it divorces these rights from traditional ideas
about national belonging that are rooted in cultural similarity.210 Yet,
as this section will demonstrate national cultural belonging remains a
critical criterion for obtaining a legal status that provides access to
important citizenship rights.
The development of a robust rights regime for TCNs grew out of
concern that they were not sufficiently integrated into European
society. TCN integration was an explicit EU agenda item at the 1999
Tampere European Council meeting.211 The Presidency Conclusions of
that meeting envisioned “an EU immigration and integration policy
that ensures ‘fair treatment’ of TCNs, granting them rights and
obligations ‘comparable to EU citizens.’ ” 212 The need for this
approach to TCN integration grew out of two realities. First, TCNs
were long-term residents within EU member states who would not be
returning to their countries of origin. Second, a significant number of
TCNs were not naturalizing in their state of residence. The failure to
naturalize was often due to TCNs being ineligible to naturalize or
onerous naturalization requirements. Once it became clear that TCNs
would not be eligible for EU citizenship, the EU began to develop a
comprehensive rights regime to ensure that long-term resident TCNs
had rights approximating those of EU citizens. Basic or fundamental
rights were allocated based on personhood, and thus covered TCNs, but
other rights were based on national citizenship.213 The EU adopted
measures to extend these citizenship rights to TCNs based on their
long-term residence. For example, freedom of movement is a right
granted to EU citizens that would otherwise be unavailable to TCNs.214
Pursuant to the Directive concerning the status of third-country
nationals who are long-term residents, TCNs who obtain a long-term
residence permit also have freedom of movement.215
In adopting the Directive on Long-Term Residents, the EU

209. SARAH WALLACE GOODMAN, IMMIGRATION AND MEMBERSHIP POLITICS IN
WESTERN EUROPE 2 (2014).
210. See e.g., SOYSAL, supra note 6.
211. Anja Wiesbrock, Discrimination Instead of Integration? Integration Requirements
for Immigrants in Denmark and Germany, in ILLIBERAL LIBERAL STS.: IMMIGR.,
CITIZENSHIP AND INTEGRATION IN THE EU 299 (Sergio Carrera et. al., eds., 2009).
212. Id.
213. This reflects Bosniak’s idea of universal norms governing “citizenship within the
community” but not “citizenship at the border.” Bosniak, supra note 4, at 33-35.
214. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 6.
215. Long-Term Residents Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 14.
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Council acquiesced to member state desires to condition access to a
long-term residence permit on evidence of cultural integration. The
Directive states that “member states may require third-country
nationals to comply with integration conditions, in accordance with
national law” as a condition for obtaining long-term residence status.216
At the time that the Directive was adopted, 2003, a number of EU
member states required TCNs seeking prolonged residence or
settlement to demonstrate proficiency in the host country language and
knowledge of the country’s values, norms, and practices. These
requirements grew out of a concern that a significant number of TCNs
who had resided in EU member states had not been successfully
integrated. Employment rates, educational attainment, language skills,
access to health and social services, and residential patterns suggested
that TCNs were trailing significantly behind member state citizens.217
In addition to traditional measures of immigrant integration, there was
a growing sense that TCNs, particularly those from the Maghreb, had
values and norms that were at odds with the mainstream EU values and
norms.218 For example, the July 7, 2005, terrorist attacks in London
committed by second-generation immigrants fueled the concern that
TCNs were not culturally integrated.219 Member states responded to
this concern by requiring TCNs who desired long-term resident permits
to demonstrate that they could speak the language and were
knowledgeable about the state’s history, values, and norms. Member
states viewed this requirement as a tool for maintaining social cohesion
in the face of a culturally diverse immigration stream.
The growing use of civic integration prerequisites for long-term
resident status undermines the claim made by postnational citizenship
scholars that a “new and more universal concept of citizenship” exists
in Europe that is “based on universal personhood rather than national
belonging.”220 The idea that this new form of citizenship is based on
the idea that “incorporation into a system of membership rights does
not inevitably require incorporation into the national collectivity” can
no longer be viewed as accurate.221 Contrary to Soysal’s claim
citizenship rights are not conferred “regardless of [a TCNs] historical
216. Id. at art. 5(2).
217. Christian Joppke, Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for
Immigrants in Western Europe, 30 W. EUROPEAN POLITICS 6, 9 (2007).
218. The Maghreb refers to Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and
Libya.
219. See London Bombers: Key Facts, BBC NEWS (5:24 PM, Jul. 21, 2005),
https://perma.cc/CKS2-GUFK.
220. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1. See Wiesbrock, supra note 211.
221. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3.
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or cultural ties to that community.”222 Cultural ties to the national
community remain critically important in allocating citizenship rights
that facilitate immigration incorporation.
B. Testing Integration
The growing trend of conditioning long-term resident status on
civic integration illustrates that liberal democracies in Europe have not
broken away from the idea that national cultural belonging is a
prerequisite for citizenship rights.223 While the EU has taken on a
bigger role in regulating immigration, “the integration of third-country
nationals (TCNs) is still essentially a matter of national control.”224
States are learning from one another and increasingly conditioning
access to long-term residence status, and the corresponding citizenship
rights, on similar integration requirements.
The integration
requirements focus on language skills, country knowledge, and national
values to ensure that those granted citizenship rights culturally
belong.225
1. The Netherlands
The Netherlands was the first country to condition permanent
residence permits on demonstrating language skills, country
knowledge, and national values.226 By the late 1990s, third-country
nationals residing in the Netherlands were not successfully integrating
into Dutch society.227 The majority of third-country nationals residing
222. Id. “The model of national citizenship, anchored in territorialized notions of
cultural belonging, was dominant during the period of massive migration at the turn of the
century, when immigrants were expected to be molded into national citizens.”
223. See MIPEX, supra note 1176. At the time that the TCNs Long-term Residence
Directive was adopted many EU Member States had such an immigration status available
that provided TCNs with the same rights as those required by the Directive. See
Groenendijk & Guild, supra note 80, at 40-41 (noting convergence of Member State laws
regarding TCNs).
224. Wiesbrock, supra note 211, at 299. (“By 2008, most member states have made the
access to various rights, ranging from initial residence rights to acquisition of citizenship,
subject to the compliance with integration conditions.”).
225. Sara Wallace Goodman, Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake?
Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies, 36 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUDIES 753, 759 (2010).
Culture as used in this article refers to values, norms, and practices. Adopting the
sociological understanding of values and norms, values as used in this project refer to
“abstract ideals” and norms refer to “principles and rules of social life that people are
expected to observe.” GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 54.
226. Goodman, supra note 225, at 759; Joppke, The Inevitable Lightening of
Citizenship, supra note 7, at 6-7; SARAH WALLACE GOODMAN, IMMIGRATION AND
MEMBERSHIP POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE 163 (2014).
227. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 6.

356

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:57

in the Netherlands were from, and continue to be from, Turkey and the
Maghreb, primarily Morocco.228 After the 1970s, the Netherlands, like
most European countries, did not have significant labor migration.229
The majority of migrants were asylum seekers or family migrants and
they were often low- or unskilled workers, had little formal education,
and no Dutch language skills.230 In terms of traditional incorporation
measures, ethnic third-country nationals’ migrants’ unemployment
rates, welfare dependency, high school drop-out rates, and
incarceration rates far exceeded those of Dutch citizens.231
Additionally, residential segregation was high.232 Government officials
responded to this integration failure by adopting civic integration
policies. The first significant policy adopted was the 1998 Newcomer
Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Niewkomers) (“WIN”).233 The goal
of this law was facilitating “migrants’ participation in mainstream
institutions . . . and ‘autonomy,’ to be achieved through Dutch
language acquisition and labour-market integration.”234 This goal was
to be achieved by requiring most third-country nationals seeking
prolonged residence in the Netherlands to take a yearlong civic
integration course.235 The course included “600 hours of Dutch
language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the labour
market.”236
The WIN has been revised a number of times since 1998. Today
two categories of migrants are required to pass a civic integration exam
as a condition for prolonged residence in the Netherlands.237 The first
category is most third-country nationals entering the Netherlands who
intend to reside for a prolonged period of time.238 The second category
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at, 6. For example, TCNs’ unemployment rates were three to 5.4 times higher
than the rates for Dutch citizens between 1999 and 2007.
232. Id. at 6.
233. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 6.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. When the WIN was first adopted most third-country nationals seeking prolonged
residence in the Netherlands had to take a yearlong civic integration course. The course
includes “600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the
labour market.” Id.
238. INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, Laws for Legal Immigration in the 27 EU Member
States 404-05, (2009), https://perma.cc/7GZ9-VCK4 [hereinafter Laws for Legal
Immigration]. The integration requirement is a requirement for obtaining a residence visa.
Id. at 404. Third-country nationals from developed OECD countries like the United States,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are exempt from this civic integration
requirement pursuant to bilateral treaties. Id. at 6, n.5.
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is most third-country nationals residing in the Netherlands seeking
permanent residence.239 Those in the first category must pass the civic
integration exam before they are issued a visa to travel to the
Netherlands.240 The exam is oral and it is taken at the Dutch embassy
in their country of residence.241 Applicants have their Dutch language
skills and knowledge about the Netherlands tested.242 For example,
applicants can be asked about “Dutch lifestyle, geography, transport,
history, constitution, democracy, legislation, Dutch language and the
importance of learning it, parenting, education, healthcare, work and
income.”243 Those in the second category do not have to take the civic
integration test if they passed it to enter the Netherlands initially.
Permanent residence permits are only available to lawfully present
migrants who have resided in the Netherlands for five years.244
The Netherlands has conditioned many TCNs’ access to long-term
residence status on national cultural belonging. This has been an
intentional move to ensure that TCNs who will become long-term, if
not life-long, residents in the Netherlands speak Dutch, have specific
knowledge about the Netherlands, and are familiar with Dutch
values.245 By 2004, the purpose of the WIN was described as
“instilling dominant Dutch ‘values and norms.’ ” 246 Civic integration
requirements were adopted in an attempt to address immigrant
integration failures and it was migrants from Morocco and Turkey that
were driving these concerns.247
239. Civic Integration, IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., https://perma.cc/XV3H4HKJ [hereinafter Civic Integration]. Third-country nationals from developed OECD
countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are exempt
from this civic integration requirement as well pursuant to bilateral treaties. Joppke, Beyond
National Models, supra note 217, at 6, n.5.
240. International Organization for Migration at 404-05.
241. Laws for Legal Immigration, supra note 238; Joppke, Beyond National Models,
supra note 217, at 7-8.
242. Laws for Legal Immigration, supra note 238, at 405.
243. Id. at 405.
244. Id. at 406. Others are exempt as well. For example, various categories of workers
are not required to obtain the visa for which passing the civic integration test is a
requirement. Id. at 406; Civic Integration, supra note 239. For example, those with a
European Blue Card from another E.U. Member State are not required to apply for the
residence visa. Civic Integration, supra note 239.
245. See Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 6-7; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 405.
246. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
247. Yet pursuant to a national court decision, migrants from Turkey are not subject to
the civic integration requirements for initial entry, only when seeking a permanent residence
permit. Bonjour, supra note 200, at 207, 214; Civic Integration, supra note 239. Turkey
has an association agreement with the European Union and based on European Court of
Justice jurisprudence regarding that agreement a Dutch national court held that integration
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As outlined in Part III, it is third-country nationals with long-term
residence status that have citizenship rights that most closely resemble
those of national citizens. Requiring civic integration in the form of
language skills and knowledge of Dutch culture and values for longterm residence status conditions citizenship rights on national cultural
belonging.
2. France
France followed the Netherlands’ approach of conditioning TCNs’
long-term residence status on civic integration. France was a likely
adopter of civic integration requirements because such requirements fit
with the French approach to national membership—republican
assimilation.248 This approach to immigration integration “requires a
high degree of assimilation in the public sphere.”249
As in the Netherlands, concerns about immigrant integration gave
rise to conditioning residence permits on the acquisition of French
language skills and knowledge about French values. In 2003, the
government began requiring all adult TCNs, and TCNs over the age of
sixteen, intending to settle in France to enter into an integration and
welcome contract.250 The integration and welcome contract begins by
describing France as a democracy, a country of rights and duties, a
secular country, and a country of equality.251 The discussion on
equality focuses exclusively on gender equality.252 Other aspects of
equality such as racial, ethnic, nationality, gender identity, and sexual
orientation are not mentioned in this discussion of equality as a
national value.253 The contract also explains that knowledge of the

requirements for family migration were incompatible with the EU-Turkey Association
Agreement. Bonjour, supra note 200, at 214. The court’s decision was limited to predeparture integration requirements for family migration by TCNs.
248. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 9.
249. KOOPMANS, ET. AL., supra note 202, at 8.
250. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 11; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 267.
251. Welcome to France, MINISTRY FOR EMP., SOC. COHESION, AND HOUSING & NAT’L
AGENCY FOR THE WELCOME OF FOREIGNERS AND MIGRATIONS (2007),
https://perma.cc/DJK7-Q86A [hereinafter French Integration Contract].
252. Id.
253. The section on equality states,
Equality between men and women is a fundamental principal of French society. Women
have the same rights and the same duties as men. Parents are jointly responsible for their
children. This principle is applied to all, French people and foreigners alike. Women are not
subject either to the authority of their husband or to that of their father or brother, for
example in terms of work, going out or opening a bank account. Forced marriages and
polygamy are forbidden, while the integrity of the body is protected by law.
Id.
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French language is critical for national unity.254 French language skills
are described as “essential to your integration, and will encourage
contact with the entire population.”255
The integration and welcome contract not only describes French
society and values, it also creates obligations for the state and the
TCNs. TCNs are required to participate in a day of civic training that
addresses “the fundamental rights principles and values of the
Republic, as well as the institutions of France,”256 to attend French
language classes (if required), to pass a French language exam, and to
attend interviews to monitor progress on fulfilling the contractual
obligations.257 These requirements must be satisfied within the first
year of residence or the noncitizens’ residence permit will not be
renewed.258 Additionally, TCNs seeking a long-term residence permit,
which is valid for ten years and has a right of automatic renewal, must
satisfy the requirements of the integration and welcome contract.259
For TCNs who are seeking to migrate to France as the spouse,
partner, or child of a French citizen or noncitizen with the right to
family reunification, the integration evaluation must be completed
before being granted permission to enter France. Individuals must
demonstrate a basic level of French language skills and knowledge of
“the values of the Republic” before being admitted to France.260
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. During civic training program TCNs watch a film entitled, “Vivre Ensemble, En
France,” (“Living Together, in France”). The French agency responsible for immigrant
integration describes the dual purposes of the film as
present[ing] to newcomers the fundamental values of the French Republic as well as each
citizen’s rights and duties (gender equality, secularism, human dignity and human rights).
Then, to provide information about the CAI and explain the duty of each migrant to respect
it in order to have their resident permit issued or renewed.
Living Together in France, L’OFFICE FRANCAIS DE L’IMMIGRATION ET DE
L’INTEGRATION (last visited Aug. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/N7Y2-MQ6P.
257. French Integration Contract, supra note 251.
258. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 11; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 265, 267.
259. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 11; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 268.
260. Laws for Legal Immigration, supra note 238, at 268.; Sara Wallace Goodman,
Controlling Immigration through Language and Country Knowledge Requirements, 34 W.
EUROPEAN POLITICS 235, 238-39 (2011) [hereinafter Controlling Immigration through
Language and Country]. The French ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Development explains,
The third-country spouse of a French national must apply for a long-stay visa from the
relevant consular office. He/she will be required to provide documentary evidence of the
French nationality of his/her spouse, of his/her marital status, and proof of an adequate
knowledge of French or of having followed the required French language training, in
countries where the OFII has put in place the procedure for assessing knowledge of French
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France offers courses outside of France that teach French language and
values for free to prepare TCNs spouses, partners, and children to pass
the required test.261
France, like the Netherlands, has conditioned access to the longterm residence permit on national cultural belonging. This is important
because long-term residence status is the status that gives TCNs
citizenship rights that approximate those of EU citizens. Before a TCN
can access freedom of movement, robust protection against
deportation, or equal access to employment, the individual must
demonstrate French language proficiency and be educated regarding
French values.262
3. Germany
Until 2000 Germany was the quintessential example of citizenship
acquisition via the jus sanguinis principle.263 Citizenship was only
available to those with German parents and those of German descent.264
These citizenship acquisition rules excluded the large number of
immigrants that arrived in Germany post-World War II.265 The
children of these immigrants who were born in Germany were treated
as immigrants.266 They were able to obtain permanent residence status,
but not citizenship.267 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Germany
experienced the same push as the Netherlands and France to better
incorporate long-term resident TCNs. TCNs in Germany, like those in
the Netherlands and France, had lower levels of educational attainment
and higher unemployment rates than German citizens.268 Like these
and the values of the Republic.
FAQ – Visas, FRENCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT’L DEV. , (2016),
https://perma.cc/FCM6-CKFE.
261. Bonjour, supra note 200.
262. A significant number of TCNs seeking to settle in France are from Francophone
countries such that French language skills are not lacking. For example, when the
integration and welcome contract requirement was first adopted it was predicted that only
one-third of the TCNs subject to the contract would be required to enroll in French language
courses. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 9.
263. Gregory Baldi & Sara Wallace Goodman, Migrants into Members: Social rights,
Civic Requirements, and Citizenship in Western Europe, W. EUR. POL. 1156 (May 22,
2015),
http://faculty.sites.uci.edu/sgoodman/files/2011/03/Baldi-andGoodman_WEP_2015.pdf.
264. BRUBAKER, supra note 68; Baldi & Goodman, supra note 263, at 1156.
265. While economic migration largely ended after the 1973-74 oil crisis due to a
government moratorium, asylum seekers and family reunification migrants continued to
arrive. Id. at 1156.
266. Id. at 1156-57.
267. Id.
268. German Education Policy and the Challenge of Migration, EUR. COMMISSION 7
(2007), http://emilie.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/wp3-germany-formatted.pdf;
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countries, Germany implemented integration requirements for migrants
seeking long-term residence. Germany had a long-term pre-existing
integration program for integrating ethnic German migrants. The
measures adopted to assist the integration of non-ethnic German TCNs
essentially extended the existing program to new migrants.269
German law requires migrants seeking permanent residence270 in
Germany to demonstrate German-language skills and to be familiar
with the German legal system, culture, and history.271 Spouses of
German citizens and foreigners with the right to family reunification
are required to demonstrate basic German-language skills before being
granted a visa to travel to Germany.272 These spouses cannot move to
Germany until they can demonstrate basic German-language skills.
This is part of the growing trend of pre-departure integration
requirements. The Federal Office of Migration and Refugees justifies
these requirements in stating that “[l]anguage skills are an elementary
requirement to ensure successful integration” and that Germany
“wishes to ensure that these people can participate in society from the
outset.”273
All other migrants seeking permanent residence must participate
in an integration course and pass a language and culture test if they
“are unable to communicate at least at a basic level in the German
language.”274 The integration course consists of approximately 600
hours of German language instruction and 30 hours of civics

International Migration Database, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (last visited
Aug. 4, 2016), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG.
269. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 12. Joppke explains that
[s]ince the 1990s Germany has offered language courses to would-be ethnic migrants in
Eastern Europe and Russia, which prepared them for a ‘status test’ that had to be passed
before they were entitled to immigrate to Germany, and after arrival there was additional
state-funded language instruction and civic orientation for a period of six months.
270. Pursuant to the Residence Act permanent residence is “generally to be assumed if
the foreigner receives a residence permit of at least one year’s duration or has held a
residence permit for more than 18 months, unless the stay is of a temporary nature.” Act on
the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory,
GERMAN FED. MINISTRY OF JUST. AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, art. 44(1) (2015),
https://perma.cc/WQG7-KJ7F [hereinafter German Residence Act].
271. Id. at art. 43(2).
272. Id. at art. 44a(1); Subsequent Entry of Spouses, FED. OFFICE OF MIGRATION &
REFUGEES, (Jun. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/U9NE-ZXL5 [hereinafter Subsequent Entry].
The Residence Act requires that these individuals “possess a sufficient command of the
German language at the time of issuance of a residence title.” German Residence Act, supra
note 243, at 44a(1). Demonstrating German-language skills at the A1 level pursuant to the
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, a beginner basic user, is
sufficient. German Residence Act, supra note 270, at 44a(1).
273. Subsequent Entry, supra note 272.
274. German Residence Act, supra note 270, at art. 44a(1).
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instruction.275 Participants are required to demonstrate German
language skills at the B1 level276 and pass the “Life in Germany”
test.277 If an individual does not satisfy these requirements they run the
risk that their residence permit will not be extended.278 Some residence
permits, however, are available as of right and must be extended even
if the integration requirements are not satisfied. For example, migrants
present based on a right to family reunification pursuant to German
constitutional law cannot have a residence permit extension denied for
failing to satisfy the integration requirements.279
One final group of migrants are subject to integration
requirements. Migrants seeking a permanent residence permit or an
EU long-term residence permit are required to demonstrate “sufficient
command of the German language,” and “possess [] a basic knowledge
of the legal and social system and the way of life in the federal
territory.”280 These requirements are deemed satisfied once an
individual completes the integration course, demonstrates Germanlanguage skills at the B1 level and passes the “Life in Germany”
exam.281
In order to obtain a permanent residence permit or an EU longterm residence permit a TCN must have had a residence permit in
Germany for five years. Since access to not only a permanent
residence permit, but also a basic residence permit, requires Germanlanguage skills and knowledge about German legal system, culture, and
history, national cultural belonging is a requirement for gaining the
legal status that gives rise to important citizenship rights in Germany.
The use of pre-arrival integration requirements for spouses of German
citizens and noncitizens entitled to family reunification more
275. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 12; Baldi & Goodman, supra
note 263.
276. B1 represents an independent user with intermediate skills pursuant to the Common
European Framework of Reference for Languages.
277. See Baldi & Goodman, supra note 263, at 1158.
278. German Residence Act, supra note 270, at art. 8(3). Residence permits in Germany
are typically granted for no longer than one year and then must be extended.
279. Id. at art. 8(3); Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 13-14.
Migrants whose right to residence is statutory rather than constitutional can be denied an
extension
unless the foreigner furnishes evidence that he or she has achieved integration into the
community and society by other means. In reaching a decision on this matter, due
consideration shall be given to the duration of lawful stay, the foreigner’s legitimate ties to
the federal territory and consequences of the termination of residence for dependents of the
foreigner who are lawfully resident in the federal territory.
German Residence Act, supra note 270, at art. 8(3).
280. German Residence Act, supra note 270, at 9(2)(7-8).
281. See Baldi & Goodman, supra note 263, at 1158.
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These
significantly limits TCNs access to citizenship rights.
individuals are unable to access German territory until they can
demonstrate national cultural belonging. Political scientist Sarah
Wallace Goodman explains that “[p]re-entry integration requirements
mandate a degree of integration into the state while the applicant is
physically and conceptually—vis-a-vis legal status—outside the
state.”282
Contrary to the claim of postnational citizenship scholars, TCNs’
access to the citizenship rights critical for immigrant incorporation
continue to be dependent upon their ability to demonstrate national
cultural belonging. Absolute protection for these rights is exclusively
available to citizens, but these rights are robustly protected for TCNs
with long-term residence status. Yet, access to long-term residence
status is substantively similar to access to citizenship status because
both require demonstration of national cultural belonging. As a
broader range of citizenship rights have been made available to thirdcountry nationals, EU member states are increasingly conditioning
access to those rights on TCNs having local language skills, being
familiar with country-specific knowledge, and sharing national values.
The discussion of The Netherlands, France, and Germany highlights
how these requirements are conditioning long-term residence status on
national cultural belonging.
C. Using Civic Integration to Identify Members
Critical rights for immigrant integration include immigrationrelated rights, economic activity rights, and political participation
rights. The most robust version of these rights are reserved for
individuals who are full members of the polity. The analysis offered in
this article demonstrates that national cultural belonging continues to
be a basis for measuring membership. While citizenship scholars and
EU officials seek to ensure that long-term resident TCNs have access
to citizenship rights that will facilitate their integration, disagreement
remains regarding the basis upon which certain rights should be
available to noncitizens. Early EU efforts suggested that long-term
lawful residence should be sufficient for granting robust resident and
membership rights. This suggested that long-term residence was a
basis for identifying members. Yet, EU member states began to

282. Controlling Immigration, supra note 260, at 237. Goodman views these
requirements as a new form of immigration restriction. Id. (“pre-entry integration
requirements are a direct attempt to regulate immigrant intake through criteria of national
membership.”).
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conclude that long-term residence in the country did not give rise to the
types of connections deemed desirable for membership. It is possible
that EU officials assumed that the desirable cultural connections would
exist by virtue of long-term residence, but EU member states are
increasingly rejecting this assumption. Not only are EU member states
testing noncitizens’ cultural belonging after long-term residence, they
are also denying entry to individuals who are unable to demonstrate
successful progress toward national cultural belonging.
These
developments suggest that despite claims made by postnational
citizenship scholars, national cultural belonging remains an important
condition for obtaining rights that facilitate integration. Noncitizens’
ability to fully develop their human capital and put it to its best use
depends on their ability to demonstrate civic integration. Whether this
is a legitimate or desirable approach to citizenship rights will be
addressed in future work. This article demonstrates that in practice we
are far from a world in which decisions about who gets citizenship
rights are divorced from “territorialized notions of cultural
belonging.”283
CONCLUSION
The introduction posed a number of questions about the ability of
a State to limit the rights of noncitizens or to condition the availability
of rights on an individual’s ability to speak English or know how to
enroll their child in elementary school. Noncitizens have gained an
increasing number of citizenship rights in the post-World War II era,
but the analysis offered in this article illustrates the limited nature of
noncitizens’ rights in the areas most important for incorporation.
Postnational citizenship scholars noticed these developments and
declared that a new approach to citizenship rights existed in which such
rights are available “based on universal personhood rather than national
belonging.”284 The postnational citizenship model accurately identifies
the unbundling of citizenship rights and decoupling of these rights from
citizenship status, but the account is incomplete. The allocation of
rights based on personhood rather than national belonging only
describes human rights. The two other categories of citizenship
rights—resident rights and membership rights—continue to be
allocated based on lawful residence and national cultural belonging.
The increasing use of civic integration requirements demonstrates EU
member states’ unease with granting robust membership rights to
283. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3.
284. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1.
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individuals who are unable to demonstrate language skills, country
knowledge, and national values. Robust protection of immigrationrelated rights, political rights, and economic rights is contingent on
individuals demonstrating national cultural belonging—a commitment
to the values, norms, and practices of the state. Individuals with
citizenship status are presumed to have the requisite level of national
cultural belonging, but noncitizens increasingly have the opportunity to
demonstrate national cultural belonging outside of the naturalization
context. A growing number of EU member states are conditioning
admission and long-term residence status on civic integration, which
measure national cultural belonging. These developments reveal the
incompleteness of the postnational citizenship model as a strategy for
limiting noncitizens’ vulnerability.
The analysis offered in this article illustrates noncitizen’s
vulnerability to executive order travel bans in the United States. While
personhood often effectively protects noncitizens within the borders of
their states of residence, it rarely provides protection at the border.
Access to legal rights not only determines the scope of government
authority over immigrants, it enables immigrants to put their individual
human capital—language skills, education, and job skills—to its best
use. Returning to the questions asked in the introduction, noncitizen
access to human rights does little to limit the government’s authority to
suspend the entry of noncitizens or deport unauthorized migrants.
Immigration-related rights are extremely robust membership rights,
limited resident rights, and nonexistent as human rights. An accurate
understanding of noncitizens’ citizenship rights is necessary to
determine which rights are outstanding, whether or not such rights alter
an immigrant’s context of reception, and whether or not such rights
should be available based on personhood, lawful residence, or
membership. This article offers the first step of this analysis by
outlining which rights are outstanding, and offering initial thoughts on
the impact that limited access to immigration-related rights, economic
activity rights, and political participation rights has on immigrants’
integration patterns. Future projects will more fully explore this issue
and explore whether or not immigration-related rights, economic
activity rights, and political participation rights must be membership
rights. The analysis presented in this article demonstrates that the
continued conditioning of citizenship rights on national cultural
belonging limits noncitizens’ access to the rights that enable them to
fully develop and utilize their human capital, which leaves them
vulnerable.

